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USING NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORPORATIONS
FOR TAX-EXEMPT FINANCING:
REVENUE RULING 63-20 REVISITED
Jeffrey G. Liss*
Revenue Ruling 63-20' provides a mechanism whereby the interest on
obligations issued by a not-for-profit corporation can be received tax-free.
Both political subdivisions and private entrepreneurs have utilized this tax-
exempt financing to construct, inter alia, schools, housing, hospitals, cable
television facilities, and even public golf courses.' The tax status of millions
of dollars of financing currently is hinged on Revenue Ruling 63-20.1 Never-
theless, during the ruling's first nineteen years of existence, only private let-
ter rulings issued by the Internal Revenue Service (I.R.S. or Service)
discussed the circumstances under which a corporation's obligations meet
the ruling's five conditions for tax-exempt status.
Although private letter rulings may not be cited as precedent,4 these
private rulings provided the only insight into the Service's positions towards
Revenue Ruling 63-20 financing. Regulations were proposed in 1976, but
never adopted.' Finally, in 1982, the Service promulgated Revenue Pro-
cedure 82-266 to "set forth the circumstances under which the Service will
ordinarily issue an advance ruling" that obligations issued by a corporation
organized under the general nonprofit corporation law of a state will be
considered obligations of a state or political subdivision and thus tax-
exempt under section 103(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code (Code). 7 This
Revenue Procedure incorporated some, but not all, of the principles ex-
pressed in the private letter rulings and in the proposed regulations, and ad-
ded some new requirements.
After generally examining Revenue Ruling 63-20, this Article will analyze
all the published private letter rulings in light of Revenue Ruling 63-20's
five requirements and will attempt to distill general guidelines followed by
the Service. The Article will consider the extent to which Revenue Pro-
* Member, Illinois Bar; A.B., Brown University; J.D., Harvard Law School; LL.M. (in
taxation), DePaul University College of Law.
1. Rev. Rul. 63-20, 1963-1 C.B. 24.
2. See infra notes 74-87 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
4. I.R.C. § 61100)(3).
5. 41 Fed. Reg. 4829 (1976) (to be codified at Treas. Reg. § 1.103) (proposed Feb. 2,
1976).
6. 1982-17 I.R.B. 16.
7. Id. Rev. Proc. 82-26 also applies to Rev. Rul. 54-296, 1954-2 C.B. 59, and Rev. Rul.
59-41, 1959-1 C.B. 13, both of which held that obligations issued by nonprofit corporations
were considered those of the cities on whose behalf they were issued. In those rulings, the
financings met standards akin to, but not the same as, those set forth in Rev. Rul. 63-20.
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cedure 82-26 and the proposed regulations follow, depart from, or fail to
consider these guidelines. Finally, the Article will assess the criticisms level-
ed at Revenue Ruling 63-20 and the appropriateness of the Service's
responses to these criticisms.
INTRODUCTION TO REVENUE RULING 63-20 FINANCING
Revenue Ruling 63-20 was promulgated under section 103 of the Internal
Revenue Code. Section 103 provides that gross income does not include in-
terest on "the obligations of a State, a Territory, or a possession of the
United States, or any political subdivision of any of the foregoing, or of the
District of Columbia." 8 The Service's regulations broadly interpret section
103 to include those obligations that have been issued by or "on behalf
of" any state or local governmental unit by constituted authorities em-
powered to issue such obligations.'
In Revenue Ruling 63-20, the Service took the position that obligations
issued by a corporation will be deemed to have been issued "on behalf of"
a state or political subdivision if five conditions are met:
(1) the corporation must engage in activities which are essen-
tially public in nature;
(2) the corporation must be one which is not organized for
profit (except to the extent of retiring indebtedness);
(3) the corporate income must not inure to any private person;
(4) the State or a political subdivision thereof [i] must have a
beneficial interest in the corporation while the indebtedness re-
mains outstanding and it [ii] must obtain full legal title to the pro-
perty of the corporation with respect to which the indebtedness
was incurred upon the retirement of such indebtedness; and
(5) the corporation must have been approved by the State or a
political subdivision thereof, either of which must also have ap-
proved the specific obligations issued by the corporation.'"
If these five conditions are satisfied, a corporation, sometimes referred to
as a 63-20 corporation, will be able to borrow money at lower interest rates
through the issuance of such obligations because the interest it pays on
those obligations will be tax-exempt to the holders of those obligations."
8. I.R.C. § 103(a)(l).
9. Treas. Reg. § 1.103-1(b).
10. Rev. Rul. 63-20, 1963-1 C.B. 24, 25.
11. For example, a taxpayer who is in a 50% tax bracket will receive an after-tax return of
only 8% on a taxed bond carrying a 16% interest rate. A tax-exempt 116 bond, therefore,
yields the investor a greater return than the 1676 taxable bond. See generally R. LAMB & S.
RAPPAPORT, THE COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF TAX-EXEMPT SECURITIES AND PUBLIC FINANCE 5-6
(1980) (chart illustrating the approximate yields taxable securities must earn in various income





A typical 63-20 financing might be structured as follows. A 63-20 corpora-
tion is established under the state's not-for-profit corporation law and obtains
an I.R.S. determination that it is an organization exempt from taxation under
section 501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code.'2 The political subdivision spon-
soring a particular project enacts a formal resolution approving the cor-
poration, the members and directors, the project, the issuance of bonds' 3
necessary to fund the project, and the legal documents necessary to effect
the foregoing. The subdivision also agrees to accept title to the intended
facility upon the retirement of the bonds.
Generally, an attempt will be made prior to the financing to obtain an
I.R.S. private letter ruling confirming the tax-exempt status of the proposed
bonds."' Based upon the private rulings issued over the past two years, a
ruling request generally takes about two to five months to be acted upon. If
there is insufficient time to secure a private letter ruling, a corporation
often relies upon an opinion of counsel.
After a confirmation by a letter ruling or a favorable opinion by counsel,
the 63-20 corporation will issue its bonds. The proceeds from the bonds will
be used to construct and equip the facility and perhaps to acquire the site.
If the political subdivision previously owned the site, however, it would be
leased to the 63-20 corporation for the duration of the bond issue for
nominal consideration. Then the 63-20 corporation will lease both the site
and the facility to another entity to operate it. This operating entity may be
the sponsoring political subdivision," a public agency,' 6 a tax-exempt
organization,' 7 or a private partnership or corporation.' 8 The lessee pays a
sufficient sum of rent to cover the principal and interest payments that the
12. I.R.C. § 501(a) exempts from taxation an extensive list of organizations described in
§ 501(c)-(d) or § 401(a).
13. Although most 63-20 financings involve bonds, notes and other financial instruments
also will qualify. See, e.g., Private Letter Ruling 8012112 (Dec. 31, 1979).
14. For a determination regarding tax exempt status under § 103, the request for a ruling is
to be made in accordance with Rev. Proc. 79-4, 1979-1 C.B. 483, for issuers, and Rev. Proc.
79-12, 1979-1 C.B. 492, for non-issuers.
The following three rulings are sought and rendered most frequently by the I.R.S. in connec-
tion with Revenue Ruling 63-20:
(1) the Bonds that will be issued by the corporation will be issued on behalf of
the District, a political subdivision of the State,
(2) interest on the Bonds will be excludable from gross income under section
103(a)(1) of the Code, and
(3) the Corporation will derive no taxable income from the financing, construc-
tion, and leasing of the [Project] to be constructed thereon.
A frequent fourth ruling is that the obligations do not constitute "Industrial Development
Bonds" under Sec. 103(b).
15. See, e.g., Private Letter Ruling 7944046 (Aug. 1, 1979) (political subdivision operating
high school).
16. See, e.g., Private Letter Ruling 8102048 (Oct. 16, 1980) (housing authority).
17. See, e.g., Private Letter Ruling 7926093 (Mar. 29, 1979) (an exempt management cor-
poration operating a housing facility for aged and indigent persons).
18. See, e.g., Private Letter Ruling 7918054 (Jan. 30, 1979) (operation of a nursing home).
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63-20 corporation must pay on the bonds it has issued. If the lessee is a
private entity, any receipts in excess of the principal and interest due as rent
constitute profit to the private entity. Thus, the lower the interest charged
on tax-exempt bonds, the greater the potential for profit to the lessee.
During the financing, the 63-20 corporation pledges the leases and rentals
to a trustee as security for its indebtedness. The real estate also may be
mortgaged. Upon retirement of the bonds, the leases of both the site and
facility terminate. The property then is transferred to the political subdivision
free and clear of all encumbrances." Such 63-20 financing arrangements
can be very advantageous both to political subdivisions and to private en-
trepreneurs.
USEFULNESS OF 63-20 FINANCING
Revenue Ruling 63-20 financing typically is used when normal financing
alternatives are unavailable. The ruling, therefore, permits construction of
projects a political subdivision otherwise might not be able to build.
Generally, a political subdivision raises funds for a project by issuing its
own debt instruments. These debt instruments may be either backed by the
subdivision's own credit20 or repayable solely from the earnings of the pro-
ject."1 These normal financing alternatives, however, are not always
available. For example, the financing of a desired project may not be per-
mitted by statute,22 or by the political subdivision's charter or budget. 23 In
19. The subdivision has the right to acquire the project earlier upon payment to the cor-
poration of the amount necessary to retire the indebtedness. See infra notes 216-19 and accom-
panying text. Until the indebtedness has been retired, however, the subdivision has no liability
with respect to the project.
20. Such instruments are called general obligation bonds. General obligation bonds are
secured by a pledge of the issuer's full faith and credit and supported by the taxing power of
the issuing governmental entity. LAMB & RAPPAPORT, supra note 11, at 9. Thus, these bonds
have been viewed as a relatively low-risk investment medium. In fact, the incidence of defaults
by local governmental units has been rare. U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENT
RELATIONS, CITY FINANCIAL EMERGENCIES: THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL DIMENSION 10 (1976).
21. Such instruments generally are called revenue bonds. Revenue bonds, unlike general
obligationi bonds, are not considered obligations of the issuing governmental entity. LAMB &
RAPPAPORT, supra note 11, at 251. Consequently, revenue bonds are redeemed with funds
derived from the particular project that they originally funded. In this manner, the financing
costs of a particular project are allocated to those who derive benefit from the project. Id. at
14. Revenue bonds typically are used to encourage industrial development by providing busi-
nesses with the low-cost financing derived from utilization of these tax-free bonds. C. AMMER &
D. AMMER, DICTIONARY OF BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS 204 (1977). See generally U.S. ADVISORY
COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BOND FINANCING
(1963) (examining bond financing of industrial development against the background of intergov-
ernmental relations). State law, however, sometimes restricts the use of revenue bonds in favor
of general obligation debts. LAMB & RAPPAPORT, supra note 11, at 283.
22. See, e.g., Private Letter Ruling 8034147 (May 30, 1980) (state law restricted commis-
sion from incurring debt that cannot be paid completely from annual earnings). Cf. Private
Letter Ruling 7837041 (June 15, 1978) (state law prohibited organization from owning real
estate).
23. See, e.g., Private Letter Ruling 7930120 (Apr. 27, 1979) (school district had insuffi-
cient funds to pay full purchase price for land).
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addition, there may be insufficient time to arrange for the normal methods
of financing" or the subdivision may not be equipped to supervise the con-
struction or management of the project. In such instances, 63-20 financing
may be available to enable the project to be built.
A private entrepreneur also may benefit from a political subdivision's
decision to use 63-20 financing. The lessee of a project built by the 63-20
corporation, for example, enjoys two basic benefits. First, because the in-
terest paid by a 63-20 corporation is tax-exempt to the recipient, the interest
rate a 63-20 corporation must pay to borrow the construction money is less
than the commercial rate. Consequently, a 63-20 corporation can charge a
lessee a lower rent to cover these interest payments than would be charged
in a strictly commercial lease. This difference in rent is profit to the private
entrepreneur lessee. Second, although the political subdivision will receive
full title, use and control of the project upon the retirement of the 63-20
financing, as a practical matter the subdivision may not want to manage the
project and, therefore, will continue to lease it to the prior lessee. Thus, in
many instances, the private entrepreneur will initiate and promote the pro-
ject, and the political subdivision merely will provide the necessary endorse-
ment and acquiescence.
Other tax benefits also may accrue in a 63-20 financing. In some jurisdic-
tions, for example, the tangible personal property purchased for the project
may be exempt from sales tax. 25 Some jurisdictions also exempt the project
from real estate taxes.2 6 In addition, there possibly may be exemptions from
personal property taxes. 27 Interest on the obligations, however, when received
in a state other than the situs of the 63-20 corporation, is likely to be sub-
ject to state and local income taxes. 8
Revenue Ruling 63-20's obvious advantages created new opportunities for
political subdivisions and private entrepreneurs. In effect, Revenue Ruling
63-20 might be described as "a kind of federal industrial revenue bond legisla-
tion."' 29 As such, the Revenue Ruling minimized the disparity between states
24. See, e.g., Private Letter Ruling 8004043 (Oct. 30, 1979) (63-20 corporation used to ac-
quire one water system while negotiations continued to purchase another system to avoid price
increase); Private Letter Ruling 7930120 (Apr. 27, 1979) (interest from promissory notes issued
for purchase of land excludable from gross income where school district had insufficient time
to obtain bond-financed loan); Private Letter Ruling 7827030 (Apr. 6, 1978) (63-20 corpora-
tion used because state suit challenging the constitutionality of an agency's existence led to
delays in issuing revenue bonds).
25. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 40-23-4 (11) (1982 Supp.); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 441 (1981) (ef-
fective July 1, 1982).
26. See, e.g., CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 231 (West Supp. 1982); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120,
§ 500.6 (1981).
27. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 40-9-1(1) (1982 Supp.); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 159.15 (West Supp.
1982).
28. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 40-184 (1975); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 290.08(8) (West Supp.
1982). But cf. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 141.632(f) (West 1976) (interest on obligations of
the federal government, state governments, or subordinate units thereof are not subject to local
income tax).
29. See Nelson, Tax Considerations of Municipal Industrial Incentive Financing, 45 TAXES
941, 944 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Nelson]. See also supra notes 20-21.
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which had industrial development legislation and those states which did not.
Liberal administration of the ruling resulted in the construction of multi-
million dollar plants and generous renewal options at nominal rentals that
assured the lessee of possession for the full normal life of the property." In
addition, passage of title to the political subdivision was deferred through
issuance of improvement bonds, with maturities beyond those of the
original bonds.' Such liberality in the administration of Revenue Ruling
63-20 was severely criticized by the former Chief Counsel of the Service,
Hart H. Spiegel, as opening "loopholes" or "truckholes" in the tax law
and as "unsound, legally and administratively." 32
LIMITATIONS ON 63-20 FINANCING
Since 1968, the 63-20 "truckhole" has been narrowed, and correspond-
ingly, the usefulness of the ruling to the borrower has been reduced but cer-
tainly not eliminated. This narrowing occurred through additional Code
provisions, the proposed regulations, the Service's own limiting glosses on
Revenue Ruling 63-20, and Revenue Procedure 82-26.
The additional Code provisions now are contained: in section 103(b), 31
removing certain defined "Industrial Development Bonds" (IDBs) from the
scope of the exemption of section 103(a); in section 103(c), removing certain
defined "arbitrage bonds"3 ' from the exemption; and in sections 103(j)
through (1), imposing certain other restrictions on tax-exempt obligations.
Section 103(b)(1) provides that an IDB shall be treated as an obligation
not described in section 103(a). Thus, interest on an IDB will be included in
the gross income of the recipient. Section 103(b)(2) defines an IDB as an
obligation of which: (A) all or a major portion (more than twenty-five
percent35) of the proceeds are to be used in the trade or business of any
non-exempt person,36 and (B) the payment for the obligation is, in whole or
major part, (i) secured by any interest in property used or to be used in a
trade or business or in payments in respect of such property, or (ii) to be
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Spiegel, Financing Private Ventures with Tax-Exempt Bonds: A Developing
"Truckhole" in the Tax Law, 17 STAN. L. REv. 224, 228 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Spiegel].
Spiegel advanced three reasons for criticizing Revenue Ruling 63-20 as unsound. First, the is-
suance of tax exempt bonds by private nonprofit corporations is not sanctioned by statute,
regulations, or court decision. Second, 63-20 financing permits private entities to serve as
financing mechanisms with much of the benefit inuring to the private entity rather than to
political subdivisions. Finally, the Service approves 63-20 financing in instances where the pur-
pose furthers objectives of private entities rather than those of political subdivisions. Thus,
Spiegel concludes that 63-20 financing decreases the country's tax base while private industry
benefits. Id.
33. I.R.C. § 103(b)(1). See infra text accompanying notes 35-45.
34. I.R.C. § 103(c)(1). See infra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
35. Treas. Reg. § 1.103-7(b)(3)(iii).
36. The term "exempt person" is defined in I.R.C. § 103(b)(3).
[Vol. 31:533
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derived from payments in respect of property, or borrowed money, used or
to be used in a trade or business.3"
Section 103(b), however, excludes from the definition of an IDB any obli-
gation issued to fund certain exempt facilities3" or industrial parks,3" or to
advance refund certain qualified public facilities."' Section 103(b)(6) also ex-
cludes from the definition of an IDB certain "small issues" aggregating less
than $1,000,000 or, in certain instances, less than $10,000,000." As of
January 1, 1983, this "small issue" exemption is not available if (i) more
than twenty-five percent of the proceeds are used to provide a facility
whose primary purpose is retail food and beverage services, automobile
sales or service, or the provision of recreation or entertainment, or (ii) any
portion of the proceeds is used to provide any private or commercial golf
course, country club, massage parlor, tennis club, skating facility, racquet
sports facility, hot tub facility, suntan facility, or racetrack. 2 Since January
1, 1983, those four types of obligations excluded from the definition of an
IDB are excluded only if the average maturity of the obligations which are
part of the issue does not exceed 120°06 of the average reasonably expected
economic life of the facilities being financed by the proceeds of such issue.
3
In addition, obligations issued after January 1, 1983, which otherwise would
37. Id. § 103(b)(2)(B).
38. Id. § 103(b)(4). The facilities excluded include:
(A) certain projects for residential rental property,
(B) sports facilities,
(C) convention or trade show facilities,
(D) airports, docks, wharves, mass commuting facilities, parking facilities, or
storage or training facilities directly related to any of the foregoing,
(E) sewage or solid waste disposal facilities or facilities for the local furnishing of
electric energy or gas,
(F) air or water pollution control facilities,
(G) certain water facilities,
(H) qualified hydroelectric generating facilities,
(I) qualified mass commuting vehicles, and
(J) local district heating or cooling facilities.
39. Id. § 103(b)(5).
40. Id. § 103(b)(7). Qualified facilities include convention or trade show facilities, wharves,
mass commuting facilities, parking facilities, or storage or training facilities directly relating to
the foregoing which are generally available to the public. Id. § 103(b)(7)(B).
41. The Service has provided guidelines to determine whether an issue is an exempt "small
issue." See id. § 103(b)(6); Treas. Reg. § 1.103-10. The conditions under which obligations can
qualify for the "small issue" exemption were significantly limited by the Tax Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA), Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 466, which added I.R.C.
§§ 103(b)(6)(K) through 103(b)(6)(O) and § 103(b)(14). The entire "small issue" exemption now
is scheduled for elimination with respect to obligations issued after December 31, 1986 (in-
cluding any obligation issued to refund an obligation issued on or before such date). I.R.C.
§ 103(b)(6)(N).
42. I.R.C. § 103(b)(6)(O) (enacted by Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982
(TEFRA)), Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 214(a), 96 Stat. 466.
43. I.R.C. § 103(b)(14) (enacted by TEFRA, § 219(a)).
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be excluded from the definition of an IDB, will be exempt only if they meet
certain new public approval requirements."
The exact mechanics of the IDB limitations are beyond the scope of this Ar-
ticle. It should be noted, however, that Revenue Ruling 63-20 will not be
useful to private parties unless the obligations issued fit within one of these
section 103(b) exclusions and, thus, can avoid being labeled as IDBs. It fur-
ther should be noted that the section 103(b) exclusions from the IDB label do
not apply with respect to any obligation when the obligation is held by any
person or a related person who is a substantial user of the facilities financed.4 ,
An obligation otherwise qualifying for tax-exempt treatment under section
103(a) nonetheless will fail to qualify if it is an "arbitrage bond." ' 46 An
obligation will be deemed an arbitrage bond if a major portion of the pro-
ceeds is reasonably expected to be used directly or indirectly either to acquire
securities or non-tax-exempt obligations that are reasonably expected to pro-
duce a yield materially higher than the yield on the arbitrage bond or to
replace funds used to acquire such securities or non-tax-exempt obligations."7
An obligation, however, will not be an arbitrage bond solely because the
proceeds may be invested temporarily in such securities or obligations until
those proceeds are needed for the purpose for which the obligation was
issued. 48 Nor will an obligation necessarily be deemed an arbitrage bond
solely because a small portion of the proceeds are invested in such securities
or other obligations as part of a reasonably required reserve fund.4 9
Concomitantly, beginning shortly after Revenue Ruling 63-20 was pro-
mulgated, the Service began to develop a series of unpublished restrictions.
Although the restrictions were applied first on an ad hoc basis, subsequent
general application of the restrictions significantly reduced the number and
dollar amount of 63-20 transactions."0 "Some of these restrictions probably
went beyond the criteria of the ruling itself, but for the most part the Service
attempted to cast them within the published framework.""' These restric-
tions will be discussed later.
44. I.R.C. § 103(k) (enacted by TEFRA, § 215(a)).
45. See I.R.C. § 103(b)(13). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.103-11 (1972) (definition of substan-
tial user).
46. I.R.C. § 103(c)(1). Extensive regulations clarify the circumstances under which an
obligation will be deemed an arbitrage bond. See Treas. Reg. § 1.103-13 to -15.
In addition, some of the private letter rulings specifically dealing with Revenue Ruling 63-20
also consider arbitrage bonds. For example, some of the rulings state that officials of the cor-
poration will execute a "no-arbitrage certificate," see, e.g., Private Letter Ruling 8015098
(Jan. 17, 1980), or explicitly do not rule on the question, see, e.g., Private Letter Ruling
8024114 (Mar. 18, 1980). In some instances, the Service rules that the obligations will not be
arbitrage bonds, see, e.g., Private Letter Ruling 8046031 (Aug. 19, 1980), or rules on specific
aspects of the arbitrage regulations, see, e.g., Private Letter Ruling 8051121 (Sept. 26, 1980).
47. I.R.C. § 103(c)(2).
48. Id. § 103(c)(4)(A).
49. Id. § 103(c)(4)(B). Generally, if no more than 1507o f the proceeds are invested in
securities, the obligation will not be considered an arbitrage bond. Treas. Reg. § 1.103-13(b)(l)(ii).
50. See Nelson, supra note 29, at 945.
51. Id.
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In addition, the Service in 1976 issued its proposed regulations under sec-
tion 103(a)(l), which would substantially modify and supersede Revenue
Ruling 63-20.11 Although the proposed regulations have not been im-
plemented, these regulations generally provide that only a "constituted
authority" of a state or political subdivision may issue obligations "on
behalf of" the subdivision. 3 An issuer of obligations would be a "con-
stituted authority" only if:
(i) it is specifically authorized by State law (creating it or
authorizing the subdivision to create it), to accomplish a public
purpose of the subdivision, which purpose must be specified in the
authorization; such authorization would have to be specifically set
forth in the constitution, charter or other organic act creating the
subdivision and provide that the subdivision may utilize the con-
stituted authority "to issue obligations" for such a purpose;
(ii) the subdivision controls the governing board of the
authority;
(iii) the subdivision has either "organizational control" over
the authority or "supervisory control" over the activities of the
authority; and
(iv) other specified conditions are met.14
To the extent that the proposed regulations, as in clause (i), would re-
quire changes in statutes or charters of political subdivisions, the proposed
regulations would limit substantially the use of Revenue Ruling 63-20. To
the extent the regulations merely would require changes i.n "control" of the
63-20 corporation or compliance with specified conditions, however, com-
pliance does not appear unreasonably difficult. Some of the proposed
regulations' requirements already appear to have been made additional,
although hitherto unwritten, preconditions for favorable 63-20 rulings."
Finally, with the proposed regulations neither formally enacted nor
withdrawn, the Service in Revenue Procedure 82-26 specified certain general
operating rules under which, if complied with, it would ordinarily rule that
obligations issued by a nonprofit corporation are those of a governmental
52. 41 Fed. Reg. 4829 (1976) (to be codified at Treas. Reg. § 1.103-1 (proposed Feb. 2,
1976)).
53. Id.
54. Id. (to be codified at Treas. Reg. § 1.103-1(c)(2)).
55. Recent Private Rulings have added the following cautionary note:
Temporary or final regulations pertaining to one or more of the issues addressed in
this ruling have not yet been adopted. Therefore, this ruling will be modified or
revoked by adoption of temporary or final regulations, to the extent the regula-
tions are inconsistent with any conclusions in the ruling. See Section 17.04 of Rev.
Proc. 80-20, 1980-26 I.R.B. 7, 17. However, when the criteria in Section 17.05 of
Rev. Proc. 80-20 are satisfied, a ruling is not revoked or modified retroactively, ex-
cept in rare or unusual circumstances.
Private Letter Ruling 8124113 (Mar. 20, 1981); Private Letter Ruling 8121124 (Feb. 27, 1981).
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unit." "The operating rules do not define, as a matter of law, the cir-
cumstances under which [such obligations] will be considered issued on
behalf of a governmental unit," and thus "the operating rules are not to be
used as tests for determining the taxability of bond interest."" A later
private letter ruling stated that, as a general rule, Revenue Procedure 82-26
"was not intended to change or add to the conditions that the Service re-
quires to be met under Rev. Rul. 63-20.""
Given these limitations on 63-20 financing, this Article will now discuss
the Service's positions. Because Revenue Ruling 63-20 has not been cited in
any subsequent revenue rulings, the analysis necessarily must be based upon
the 125 private letter rulings published through October 29, 1982, which
have cited Revenue Ruling 63-20,19 the proposed regulations, and Revenue
Procedure 82-26. Although, as stated, private letter rulings may not be cited
as precedent, 6" analysis of these materials should enable future transactions
to be structured so as to qualify under Revenue Ruling 63-20's five condi-
tions.
THE FIVE CONDITIONS
1. Public Nature of Activities
Revenue Ruling 63-20 requires, first, that "the corporation must engage
in activities which are essentially public in nature" 6, In determining whether
the first requirement is met, the Service considers such factors as the cor-
porate purposes and activities, and the location of the financed facility.
The Service focuses on whether the "activities" of the corporation, rather
than the specific project, are public in nature. Consequently, the published
private letter rulings usually recite the purposes set forth in the corporate
charter and describe the project to be financed. The published rulings seem
to equate "corporate purposes" with "activities." For example, in one
private letter ruling,62 the Service concluded that because the foundation's
purpose, as set forth in its articles, was to further the work of a state
university, the activities were essentially public. Under Revenue Procedure
82-26, the public activities requirement will be deemed met if, inter alia,
56. Rev. Proc. 82-26, § 3, 1982-17 I.R.B. 16, 17. Section 3 states that the operating rules
were intended only to assist issuers of governmental obligations and other parties in preparing
ruling requests, and that the rules were "not to be used as tests for determining the taxability
of bond interest." Id. at 17.
57. E.g., Rev. Proc. 82-26, § 2, 1982-17 I.R.B. 16, 17.
58. Private Letter Ruling 8248131 (Aug. 31, 1982).
59. Private letter rulings are available in STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH), and on LEXIS,
Fedtax library, CBPR file. See infra APPENDIX for a listing of private letter rulings.
60. Section 61100)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code provides that "[u]nless the Secretary
otherwise establishes by regulations, a written determination may not be used or cited as prece-
dent." I.R.C. § 6110(j)(3).
61. Rev. Rul. 63-20, 1963-1 C.B. 24, 25.
62. Private Letter Ruling 8029026 (Apr. 22, 1980).
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"the activities and purposes" of the corporation are those permitted under
the general nonprofit corporation law of the State.'3
In most cases, the nature of the corporation's purposes will not differ
from its activities. The published rulings note corporate purposes that are
directly public in nature, such as building a hospital64 or providing low-
income housing. 65 Other published rulings recite corporate purposes that
are indirectly public in nature in that the corporation assists another entity
whose purposes are clearly public in nature. Assistance to a university66 or
water district 6 are examples of indirect public purposes. None of the
published private letter rulings has involved a situation in which one or
more of the corporate purposes, activities, or projects might be public in
nature while another one or more of them might not be public. Nor have
any of the rulings denied 63-20 qualification for failure to qualify under
this first condition.
Thus, the public activities requirement has been liberally construed and
permits the construction of a wide-range of projects. Illustrative of the
broad scope of this first condition is Revenue Ruling 63-20 itself. The not-
for-profit corporation considered in the ruling had been organized for the
general purpose of stimulating industrial development within a county. Pur-
suant to its articles of incorporation, the corporation issued interest-bearing
revenue bonds to acquire a site and to construct and equip a factory. It
subsequently leased the property to an industrial firm. The ruling concluded
that the bonds did not meet the fourth and fifth requirements set forth in
the ruling and thus were not issued "on behalf of" a political subdivision.6 8
Consequently, the interest on the bonds was includable in the gross income
of the bondholders. The clear implication, however, was that the construc-
tion of a factory for lease to a private party met the first requirement that
the activity be essentially public in nature. Yet that activity- construction of
a factory for lease to an industrial firm-seems to be as unpublic a public
nature as possible. Moreover, in a recent private letter ruling, the financing
qualified under 63-20 when the proceeds were to be used to build a retail
shopping facility to be designated as a factory outlet center. 69
The subsequent published letter rulings do not aid in discerning the limits
of the "public nature" requirement. Only two of these letter rulings involved
construction ° or expansion' of a factory, and in both instances, the pro-
jects were granted tax-exempt status. Similar private party involvement did
63. Rev. Proc. 82-26, § 3.011, 1982-17 I.R.B. 16, 18 (emphasis added).
64. See, e.g., Private Letter Ruling 8024114 (Mar. 18, 1980); Private Letter Ruling 8005031
(Nov. 7, 1979).
65. See, e.g., Private Letter Ruling 8116088 (Jan. 23, 1981).
66. See, e.g., Private Letter Ruling 8037107 (June 20, 1980).
67. See, e.g., Private Letter Ruling 8104136 (Oct. 30, 1980).
68. Rev. Rul. 63-20, 1963-1 C.B. 24.
69. Private Letter Ruling 8247081 (Aug. 25, 1982).
70. Private Letter Ruling 8124149 (Mar. 23, 1981).
71. Private Letter Ruling 6508165150A (Aug. 16, 1965).
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not prevent the use of 63-20 financing to construct two buildings for private
flight testing, research, and development. 2 In this private letter ruling, the
63-20 corporation proposed to lease a site from the airport district, to issue
bonds to construct two buildings on the site, and then to lease the site and
the buildings back to the district. The district then would lease the buildings
to the private corporations for their use. Although the Service ultimately
ruled that the bonds would constitute IDBs, it expressly held that the trans-
action conformed with the requirements of Revenue Ruling 63-20. Thus, the
public nature requirement had been met even in this situation. In fact, in-
volvement by private persons in the corporation's activities has never
prevented qualification of 63-20 financing in any of the published letter rul-
ings."
Typical facilities that have received 63-20 financing include: low-income
housing, 4 housing for the elderly," school facilities,7 6 hospitals and medical
facilities,77 nursing homes, 78 combinations of the foregoing, 9 courtrooms
and jails,8 0 and water systems.8 More unusual was the use of 63-20 financ-
ing to construct tourist facilities,' 2 cable television transmitting and receiv-
72. Private Letter Ruling 8116088 (Jan. 23, 1981).
73. Obligations could meet the requirements of Rev. Rul. 63-20, but not qualify for tax-
exempt status because private involvement made the issue an IDB. See supra notes 35-36 and
accompanying text.
74. See, e.g., Private Letter Ruling 8116088 (Jan. 23, 1981); Private Letter Ruling 8012112
(Dec. 31, 1979); Private Letter Ruling 7815014 (Jan. 11, 1978).
75. See, e.g., Private Letter Ruling 8102048 (Oct. 16, 1980); Private Letter Ruling 8046031
(Aug. 19, 1980); Private Letter Ruling 8004053 (Oct. 30, 1979); Private Letter Ruling 7926093
(Mar. 29, 1979); Private Letter Ruling 7815014 (Jan. ii, 1978).
76. See, e.g., Private Letter Ruling 8037107 (June 20, 1980); Private Letter Ruling 8007054
(Nov. 23, 1979); Private Letter Ruling 7951099 (Sept. 21, 1979); Private Letter Ruling 7928013
(Apr. 10, 1979); Private Letter Ruling 7926154.(Mar. 30, 1979) (amending Private Letter Rul-
ing 7915062 (Jan. 15, 1979)); Private Letter Ruling 7904122 (Oct. 27, 1978); Private Letter
Ruling 7832115 (May 15, 1978).
77. See, e.g., Private Letter Ruling 8142041 (July 21, 1981); Private Letter Ruling 8117081
(Jan. 28, 1981) (amending Private Letter Ruling 8115095 (Jan. 19, 1981)); Private Letter Rul-
ing 8038183 (June 30, 1980); Private Letter Ruling 8034067 (May 29, 1980); Private Letter Rul-
ing 8005031 (Nov. 7, 1979); Private Letter Ruling 7946040 (Aug. 16, 1979).
78. See, e.g., Private Letter Ruling 8051121 (Sept. 26, 1980); Private Letter Ruling 7946014
(Aug. 15, 1979); Private Letter Ruling 7932071 (May 11, 1979); Private Letter Ruling 7842013
(July 18, 1978); Private Letter Ruling 7824059 (Mar. 20, 1978); Private Letter Ruling 7726062
(Apr. 5, 1977).
79. See, e.g., Private Letter Ruling 8038131 (June 27, 1980); Private Letter Ruling 8038117
(June 27, 1980); Private Letter Ruling 7918054 (Jan. 30, 1979); Private Letter Ruling 7842013
(July 18, 1978); Private Letter Ruling 7824029 (Mar. 15, 1978).
80. See, e.g., Private Letter Ruling 8145078 (undated); Private Letter Ruling 8121170 (Mar.
2, 1981); Private Letter Ruling 7741037 (July 18, 1977).
81. See, e.g., Private Letter Ruling 8104136 (Oct. 30, 1980); Private Letter Ruling 8032046
(May 13, 1980); Private Letter Ruling 8017124 (Jan. 31, 1980); Private Letter Ruling 8004043
(Oct. 30, 1979); Private Letter Ruling 8003124 (Oct. 29, 1979); Private Letter Ruling 8003102
(Oct. 26, 1979); Private Letter Ruling 7944086 (July 31, 1979); Private Letter Ruling 7907072
(Nov. 16, 1978); Private Letter Ruling 7906053 (Nov. 9, 1978); Private Letter Ruling 7807076
(Nov. 21, 1977).
82. See, e.g., Private Letter Ruling 8034147 (May 30, 1980).
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ing facilities 83 a public golf course, 4 a restaurant on a public golf course,"
a university sports facility, 6 and a public resort. 7
Although the Service has never used this first condition to deny 63-20 qual-
ification, one factor, the location of the proposed facility, may influence the
Service. In one private letter ruling,88 the Service hinted that, except in
unusual circumstances, a project might fail to meet the public activities test of
Revenue Ruling 63-20 if the proposed facilities were not constructed within
the geographical boundaries of the political subdivision. In this ruling, a
corporation proposed to construct, on behalf of City A, a hospital in City
B. The facilities eventually were to be granted outright to City A. City A,
approximately twenty-fiveair miles and forty-three road miles from City B,
was a trade center for the surrounding agricultural area and served as a
residential community for the City B area. Surplus hospital revenues would
be used to pay for some health care services in City A. Furthermore,
residents of City A using the hospital would receive discounts. Based on
these factors, the Service found a "substantial nexus between City A and
the Hospital" to grant the project tax-exempt status.
This concern for a substantial nexus also would seem applicable if, for ex-
ample, a political subdivision sought to construct water facilities or power
generation facilities outside its boundaries. None of the published letter rul-
ings, however, discusses this issue concerning the extent of the required nexus.
Nonetheless, analogy may be found in Revenue Ruling 77-281,89 in which the
Service ruled that the IDBs a city had issued to finance railroad rolling stock
would not qualify as an exempt small issue. The Service based its decision on
two factors. First, the rolling stock would not "be established within [one]
incorporated municipality or . . . county," but rather would be used in
several. Second, the rolling stock would not be "located within the boun-
daries of the issuer" (or within the boundaries of the political subdivision in
which the issuer is located) and, therefore, would not have "a substantial
connection" with the issuing city.9" This principle is echoed in Revenue Pro-
cedure 82-26, which requires that the property financed be located within
the geographical boundaries of or have a substantial connection with the
governmental unit on whose behalf the obligations are issued. 9'
83. See, e.g., Private Letter Ruling 8015079 (Jan. 16, 1980).
84. See, e.g., Private Letter Ruling 8015098 (Jan. 17, 1980).
85. See, e.g., Private Letter Ruling 7911097 (Dec. 18, 1978).
86. See, e.g., Private Letter Ruling 8029026 (Apr. 22, 1980).
87. See, e.g., Private Letter Ruling 7926052 (Mar. 28, 1979).
88. Private Letter Ruling 7829123 (Apr. 24, 1978).
89. Rev. Rul. 77-281, 1977-2 C.B. 31.
90. Id. at 31-32.
91. Rev. Proc. 82-26, § 3.012, 1982-17 I.R.B. 16, 18. Compare id. with I.R.C. § 103(b)(6)(K)
(enacted by TEFRA § 215(a)). In Private Letter Ruling 8305018 (Oct. 29, 1982), the financing of
a cable television facility two miles outside a city, but on land owned by the city, qualified under
Rev. Rul. 63-20 as obligations issued by the city. See also Private Letter Ruling 7837041 (June 15,
1978) (a trust proposing to issue obligations on behalf of eight political subdivisions, instead of
just one, was denied a 63-20 exemption). See Rev. Proc. 82-26, § 3.041(a).
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Under the proposed regulations, additional limiting factors would be
placed on this first requirement. These regulations would require that the
issuer of the obligations be expressly authorized by law to accomplish a
public purpose or purposes of the political subdivision and that these pur-
poses be specified.9 In addition, the issuer must be created and operated
solely to accomplish those purposes." Presumably, therefore, the more
limited the purposes of a 63-20 corporation, the more favorably the Service
will look upon a ruling request.
2. Corporation Not Organized For Profit
Second, Revenue Ruling 63-20 requires that "the corporation must be
one which is not organized for profit (except to the extent of retiring in-
debtedness)." 9' Under this second requirement, both the law under which
the corporation is organized and the tax status of the corporation are con-
sidered.
Although the second condition initially was not phrased as narrowly,
Revenue Ruling 63-20 later in its text stated that "not organized for profit"
refers to corporations organized under a state's general nonprofit corpora-
tion law." Virtually all the corporations in the published private letter rul-
ings were organized under such a state statute. Even where the entity issuing
the obligations was denominated a foundation, an authority, or a trust, 98
it had been organized under a state's general nonprofit corporation statute
and qualified under Revenue Ruling 63-20. However, a foundation incor-
porated under a state law for the formation of foundations and holding
companies also qualified under Revenue Ruling 63-20. 99 In another ruling, a
trust (which was not a nonprofit corporation) created under a state's com-
mon law rather than a nonprofit statute failed to qualify for several reasons
but the trust status was not discussed." ' An inference could be drawn that
under other circumstances such a trust might qualify for 63-20 financing.'0 '
92. 41 Fed. Reg. 4829 (1976) (to be codified at Treas. Reg. § 1.103-1(c)(2)(i) (proposed
Feb. 2, 1976).
93. Id. (to be codified at Treas. Reg. § 1.103-1(c)(2)(vi)). Cf. Private Letter Ruling 8204180
(Oct. 30, 1981) ("sole purpose" of the corporation was constructing or acquiring the facilities);
Private Letter Ruling 8133057 (May 20, 1981) ("only business" of the 63-20 corporation was
the project financed).
94. Rev. Rul. 63-20, 1963-1 C.B. 24, 25.
95. Id.
96. See Private Letter Ruling 8037107 (June 20, 1980); Private Letter Ruling 8029026 (Apr.
22, 1980).
97. See Private Letter Ruling 8152124 (Oct. 5, 1981).
98. See Private Letter Ruling 7949054 (Sept. 6, 1979) (although trust was a nonprofit cor-
poration, tax-exempt status denied for failure to fulfill other Revenue Ruling 63-20 conditions).
99. Private Letter Ruling 8007054 (Nov. 23, 1979).
100. See Private Letter Ruling 7837041 (June 15, 1978).
101. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 57-151, 1957-1 C.B. 64, cited in Private Letter Ruling 7837041
(June 15, 1978) (obligations issued by a trust created under a specific state law for the fur-
therance of public functions qualified under I.R.C. § 103(a)(1)).
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In contrast, in one ruling in which a stock corporation was involved, the
Service denied qualification under Revenue Ruling 63-20 "in part because
the Corporation [was] not a non-profit Corporation." 102
Under the proposed regulations' "organizational control" requirement, a
subdivision would have "organizational control" only if, inter alia, the
issuer was specially created and "not [created] under a statute providing
generally for the organization of entities, such as a statute providing for the
organization of nonprofit corporations." 103 Such special creation obviously
would be more difficult to obtain, thus limiting opportunities for 63-20
financing.
A second factor to consider when analyzing whether a project will meet
the second condition is the tax-exempt status of the 63-20 corporation.
Although Revenue Ruling 63-20 does not explicitly require a corporation to
be an organization described in section 501(c) exempt from taxation under
section 501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code,'"' such a status is useful. Tax-
exempt status was mentioned in only about one-fourth of the published let-
ter rulings. In the majority of those rulings, however, the Service also con-
sidered whether the obligations were IDBs 1"" for which a section 501(c)(3)
tax-exempt status determination was relevant.' 06
3. Corporate Income Not Inuring to Private Persons
Revenue Ruling 63-20 requires, third, that "the corporate income must
not inure to any private person." I" In determining whether this third re-
quirement is met, the Service considers such factors as the language in the
corporate charter, the disposition of corporate income, the disposition of
102. Private Letter Ruling 8047096 (Aug. 28, 1980). The corporation was organized under a
special statute with a corporate purpose to acquire, construct, and operate municipally-aided
housing and received certain tax exemptions from the municipality.
103. 41 Fed. Reg. 4829 (1976) (to be codified at Treas. Reg. § 1.103-1(c)(2)(iii)(B)(2)) (pro-
posed Feb. 2, 1976).
104. I.R.C. § 501(c) describes organizations that are exempt from taxation under § 501(a).
See supra note 12. In all cases except two, the private letter rulings referred to § 501(c)(3).
These two rulings concerned § 501(c)(4). See Private Letter Ruling 7737009 (June 14, 1977)
(corporation established to promote fire protection services of District was civic association
within meaning of § 501(c)(4)); Private Letter Ruling 7409240390A (Sept. 24, 1974) (corpora-
tion organized to promote educational services qualified as § 501(c)(4) organization).
105. In the following letter rulings, the IRS did not refer to IDB status. See Private Letter
Ruling 8142041 (July 21, 1981); Private Letter Ruling 8037107 (June 20, 1980); Private Letter
Ruling 8029026 (Apr. 22 1980); Private Letter Ruling 7946014 (Aug. 15, 1979); Private Letter
Ruling 7926052 (Mar. 28, 1979); Private Letter Ruling 7817086 (Jan. 27, 1978); Private Letter
Ruling 7737009 (June 14, 1977); Private Letter Ruling 7605210220A (May 21, 1976); Private
Letter Ruling 7409240390A (Sept. 24, 1974).
106. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. Section 3.041(a) of Revenue Procedure 82-26
provides that for purposes of determining whether an obligation is an IDB, a nonprofit cor-
poration that meets the other requirements of that subparagraph will be considered an exempt
person (for § 103(b)(3) purposes, see supra text accompanying notes 35-36) even if it is not ex-
empt under § 501(c)(3). See I.R.C. § 103(b)(3)(B).
107. Rev. Rul. 63-20, 1963-1 C.B. 24, 25.
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corporate assets (other than the facilities financed) upon dissolution, and
perhaps the receipt of benefits other than directly through the corporation.
In considering whether this third requirement is fulfilled, the Service ex-
amines the corporation's charter. Most of the published private letter rulings
recite corporate charter provisions to the effect that no corporate earnings,
net earnings, income, net income, funds, assets, property, gains, profits,
dividends, or the like shall inure to, or be received by, any person, any
private person, or any member, director or officer, or the like, or various
combinations of the foregoing.108 Apparently no special wording is re-
quired, and provisions meeting state not-for-profit statutory standards seem
acceptable. Variations in charter provisions seem attributable to variations
in state not-for-profit corporation statutes and to I.R.S. paraphrasing.
Revenue Procedure 82-26 adds the requirement that "in fact" the corporate
income not inure to private persons,'0 9 but does not discuss when inurement
should be considered.
Two exceptions to this general rule against inurement of income to
private persons exist. In more than a quarter of the rulings, the cited
language indicates an exception that permits inurement of net earnings to
the political subdivision that had sponsored the 63-20 corporation."10 The
proposed regulations would confirm this exception for political subdivi-
sions."' In several other rulings in which corporations qualified for 63-20
status, an additional exception allowed inurement as "reasonable compensa-
tion for services rendered." ' Such inurement does not seem inconsistent
with either Revenue Ruling 63-20 or the proposed regulations.
In addition to these exceptions, several other special problems have arisen
with regard to distribution of corporate assets and receipt of non-income
benefits from 63-20 transactions. Revenue Ruling 63-20 only considers
disposition of the title to the financed property. It does not mandate any
particular disposition of other corporate assets upon liquidation or dissolu-
108. See, e.g., Private Letter Ruling 8046031 (Aug. 19, 1980) ("no part of the assets, in-
come or profit of Corp. X shall inure to the benefit of any member, director or officer of the
Corporation"); Private Letter Ruling 8015098 (Jan. 17, 1980) ("[nlo gains, profits, or dividends
shall be distributed to any of the members of the Corporation, and no part of the net earnings
shall inure to the benefit of any person, except the District"); Private Letter Ruling 8004043
(Oct. 30, 1979) ("no part of the net earnings of the corporation shall ever inure to the benefit
of any person other than the city"); Private Letter Ruling 7827030 (Apr. 6, 1978) ("nor will
any of its income ever inure to any private person").
109. Rev. Proc. 82-26, § 3.03, 1982-17 I.R.B. 16, 18.
110. See, e.g., Private Letter Ruling 8136055 (June 11, 1981); Private Letter Ruling 8015098
(Jan. 17, 1980).
Ill. See 41 Fed. Reg. 4829 (1976) (to be codified at Treas. Reg. § 1.103-1(c)(iv)) (proposed
Feb. 2, 1976) ("[any net earnings ... may not inure to the benefit of any person other than
the [subdivision]").
112. See, e.g., Private Letter Ruling 8042050 (July 23, 1980); Private Letter Ruling 7930120
(Apr. 27, 1979); Private Letter Ruling 7817130 (Jan. 30, 1978); Private Letter Ruling 7726066
(Apr. 5, 1977) But see Private Letter Ruling 8004053 (Oct. 30, 1979) (corporate bylaws pro-
vided that directors would not be paid for services as officers "or in any other capacity or pur-
suant to any other contractual arrangement whatever").
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tion either to the sponsoring political subdivision or to a recipient permitted
under a state's not-for-profit corporation act. In more than a dozen of the
published private letter rulings, however, the articles of incorporation pro-
vided for distribution to the political subdivision.'" In at least two rulings,
distributions were permitted to certain other public entities or charitable
organizations. "4
In contrast, in one private letter ruling, which denied 63-20 status on
other grounds, the Service added, "Furthermore, if the Corporation is
dissolved there is no guarantee that its assets would pass to the State or any
political subdivision in the State."'' 5 In addition, "capital stockholders"
could realize limited gains when they sold their "shares." Thus, it would be
advisable to include a provision in the charter of a 63-20 corporation direct-
ing that upon dissolution of the corporation all property owned by the
issuer be vested in the political subdivision. The proposed regulations' re-
quirement for such a provision lends support to this advice. ' 6
The timing of this transfer of assets may vary. Some of the letter rulings
recite that the corporation will dissolve when its obligations have been
paid." 7 Others state that all property of the corporation will become the
property of the political subdivision upon the earlier of the expiration of
the lease or the retirement of the 63-20 indebtedness." ' An immediate
transfer, however, does not seem to be required.
Another area of concern under the third condition for 63-20 qualification
is the inurement of benefits to private persons from 63-20 projects.
Although Revenue Ruling 63-20 prohibits a private person from receiving
corporate income, it does not prohibit private persons from benefiting from
a 63-20 financing' provided that their benefit is not through the corpora-
tion and the obligations issued do not constitute IDBs." °
Thus, the Service frequently has qualified financings under Revenue Rul-
ing 63-20 even though private persons would lease or operate the facilities
113. See, e.g., Private Letter Ruling 8247081 (Aug. 25, 1982); Private Letter Ruling 8226058
(Mar. 30, 1982); Private Letter Ruling 8211028 (Dec. 15, 1981); Private Letter Ruling 8204180
(Oct. 30, 1981); Private Letter Ruling 8102048 (Oct. 16, 1980); Private Letter Ruling 8034067
(May 29, 1980); Private Letter Ruling 8024114 (Mar. 18, 1980); Private Letter Ruling 7921043
(Feb. 23, 1979); Private Letter Ruling 7915062 (Jan. 15, 1979); Private Letter Ruling 7827030
(Apr. 6, 1978); Private Letter Ruling 7608139210A (Aug. 13, 1976).
114. See Private Letter Ruling 7947037 (Aug. 22, 1979) ("the property will not inure to the
benefit of any private person except a foundation or corporation organized and operated for
charitable purposes"); Private Letter Ruling 7605210220A (May 21, 1976) (distribution permit-
ted "to the United States, the State . . . or any political subdivision thereof, or to any
organization that has been declared exempt under Section 501(c)(3) of the Code").
115. Private Letter Ruling 8047096 (Aug. 28, 1980).
116. 41 Fed. Reg. 4829 (1976) (to be' codified at Treas. Reg. § 1.103-1(c)(2)(v)) (proposed
Feb. 2, 1976). Private Letter Ruling 8211028 (Dec. 15, 1981) recited that the political 'subdivi-
sion would even be "entitled to the net income of the corporation."
117. See, e.g., Private Letter Ruling 7835075 (June 1, 1978).
118. See, e.g., Private Letter Ruling 8104136 (Oct. 30, 1980).
119. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 35-45 and accompanying text.
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involved. For example, the Service permitted the leasing of a 63-20 financed
silver and silica concentrate mill to a non-exempt corporation,'"' the leasing
of nursing homes to private operators,' 2 and the contracting out of
management rights by a private partnership to a private operator.' 3 The
Service also has permitted portions of the premises that involved a specified
portion of the 63-20 financing proceeds to be leased to private persons.' 24
Moreover, 63-20 financing has been approved when management fees owed
to private persons were fixed,'12 a percentage of the gross revenue,', 6 a
combination of both of these,'" or when the fees included a cost-of-living
adjustment.2 9 In some instances, however, the fee merely was represented
to be "reasonable."' 29
The majority of the rulings that permitted leasing or operation by
private persons recite the specific and fairly short time limits of these
management contracts, viz., one, three, or five years. The political subdivi-
sions also had the right to approve the renewals or to terminate prematurely
these short-term contracts. The recitation of such arrangements with private
persons, however, is consistent with an inquiry into the IDB aspects of a
proposed financing. In fact, in almost all of those rulings considering such
contractual arrangements, the Service specifically considered whether the ar-
rangements would render the financings to be IDBs rather than qualified
63-20 financings. Although such private involvement might render an
obligation an IDB, it does not prohibit qualification under Revenue Ruling
63-20.
Nevertheless, if private persons are significantly involved with the project
as, for example, a lessee, operator or manager, prudence would dictate that
they also not be involved as members, directors or officers of the 63-20 cor-
poration.'30 In one recent private letter ruling, the Service stated that the
prohibition against inurement "includes indirect inurement." ," The ruling
121. See Private Letter Ruling 8124149 (Mar. 23, 1981).
122. See, e.g., Private Letter Ruling 7726066 (Apr. 5, 1977).
123. See Private Letter Ruling 7918054 (Jan. 30, 1979).
124. See Private Letter Ruling 8034067 (May 29, 1980) (1/32 of premises leased); Private
Letter Ruling 7817130 (Jan. 30, 1978) (10% of premises leased).
125. See Private Letter Ruling 8034067 (May 29, 1980); Private Letter Ruling 8004043 (Oct.
30, 1979); Private Letter Ruling 7947037 (Aug. 22, 1979) (failed to qualify under 63-20 on
other grounds); Private Letter Ruling 7829123 (Apr. 24, 1978).
126. See Private Letter Ruling 7842013 (July 18, 1978).
127. See Private Letter Ruling 8046031 (Aug. 19, 1980); Private Letter Ruling 7911097 (Dec.
18, 1978).
128. See Private Letter Ruling 8038131 (June 27, 1980); Private Letter Ruling 7946014 (Aug.
15, 1979); Private Letter Ruling 7932071 (May 11, 1979).
129. See Private Letter Ruling 8008034 (Nov. 27, 1979); Private Letter Ruling 7947065 (Aug.
22, 1979) (failed to qualify under 63-20 on other grounds); Private Letter Ruling 7932071 (May
11, 1979).
130. Cf. Private Letter Ruling 8004043 (Oct. 30, 1979) (Service specifically ruling that the
bonds were not IDBs); Private Letter Ruling 7947037 (Aug. 22, 1979) (ruling did not refer to
IDBs).
131. Private Letter Ruling 8247081 (Aug. 25, 1982).
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said, as an example, that if an officer or director of the corporation is also
an employee or director of a bank, "care must be taken by the [corpora-
tion] to insure that all its transactions with the bank are at arms length.""'
4. Political Subdivision's Beneficial Interest
Revenue Ruling 63-20 requires, fourth, that the state or political subdivi-
sion "have a beneficial interest in the corporation while the indebtedness re-
mains outstanding" and "obtain full legal title to the property of the corpora-
tion with respect to which the indebtedness was incurred upon the retirement
of such indebtedness." I" The Service has imposed an array of stringent con-
ditions that must be met before this requirement will be fulfilled.
a. Restrictions on the Project
First, the use of the proceeds from the 63-20 financing is restricted. These
restrictions appear to apply to all of the proceeds rather than to a "major
portion" or "substantially all" of the proceeds as with IDBs.' 34 When
determining whether all of the proceeds of a 63-20 financing are being used
properly, the Service apparently means "net proceeds." Neutral costs, such
as the expenses related to the financing, do not seem to be considered as be-
ing part of the net proceeds.' 3 Such neutral costs also might include the
underwriter's discount' 3 or issuing expenses or fees.' 37 The rulings do not
indicate, however, whether net proceeds must be any minimum percentage
of gross proceeds or whether such finance-related expenses can be so
disproportional as to warrant denying 63-20 qualification.
Although proceeds may be used for the administrative expenses of the
financing, the Service specifically has indicated that the proceeds would not
be used for the legal or organizational expenses of the corporation.'38 In
132. Id.
133. Rev. Rul. 63-20, 1963-1 C.B. 24, 25.
134. See supra notes 35-45 and accompanying text. Compare I.R.C. § 103(b)(2)(A) ("all or
a major portion" or proceeds to be used by non-exempt person) with id. § 103(b)(4)-(7)
("substantially all" of proceeds to be used for various, specified purposes). See also Private
Letter Ruling 8047069 (Aug. 28, 1980) (use of "substantially all" test for IDB determination).
135. See, e.g., Private Letter Ruling 8029033 (Apr. 22, 1980). The term "good or neutral
costs" is specifically referred to in Private Letter Ruling 8136055 (June 11, 1981). See also
Rev. Proc. 82-26, § 3.052, 1982-17 I.R.B. 16, 19, which considers "original proceeds" to be
calculated "after payment of all expenses of issuing the obligations."
136. See, e.g., Private Letter Ruling 8102048 (Oct. 16, 1980).
137. See, e.g., Private Letter Ruling 8046031 (Aug. 19, 1980); Private Letter Ruling 8004053
(Oct. 30, 1979). Treas. Reg. § 103-8(a)(6) issuing expenses and fees include bond election costs,
costs of publishing notices, attorneys' fees, printing costs, trustees' fees for fiscal agents and
similar expenses. See also Rev. Rul. 79-332, 1979-2 C.B. 38 ("if a portion of cost labeled as is-
suance costs is in fact used for another purpose, such portion may not be deducted as issuance
costs in arriving at bond issue proceeds"). In addition, these expenses may include engineering
and auditing costs. See Private Letter Ruling 7906053 (Nov. 9, 1978).
138. Private Letter Ruling 7946014 (Aug. 15, 1979).
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one private letter ruling, the applicant satisfied this distinction by amending
its request to specify that the financing proceeds would not be used for
"reasonably required insurance reserves." "I
The most important of the restrictions on the use of these net proceeds
requires that the proceeds be used to acquire or construct tangible
property.' 4 0 This insures that the state or political subdivision receives prop-
erty. For example, a series of eight substantially identical rulings 4 ' denied
63-20 qualification- to bond issues for the acquisition of mortgage notes
secured by first mortgage liens on owner-occupied homes purchased by low
and moderate income families within the geographic boundaries of the
sponsoring political subdivisions. The Service observed that "when the
bonds are redeemed, little or no property will remain for Corporation X to
turn over to City Y." 42
Other rulings have echoed this theme. Some 63-20 financings were condi-
tioned upon the use of the financing proceeds for "capitalizable assets" ,,3
or for assets "capitalizable under Sec. 266 of the Code." 1 The Service
also has precluded the use of proceeds for administrative expenses unless
the expenditures constituted capital expenditures under sections 263 or 266
of the Internal Revenue Code."'4 Such particular restrictions appear to be
merely exemplary rather than mandatory. Other rulings have recited more
generally that the proceeds may not be used for "nondepreciable" assets.' 4 6
139. Private Letter Ruling 7815014 (Jan. 11, 1978).
140. See Private Letter Ruling 7829133 (Apr. 24, 1978); Private Letter Ruling 7824059 (Mar.
20, 1978). See also Private Letter Ruling 8028016 (Apr. 15, 1980) (backup loan failed to
qualify because the indebtedness to be incurred was not tangible property, but a vehicle for
facilitating financing); Private Letter Ruling 7605210220A (May 21, 1976) ("intangible proper-
ty, including contracts, notes receivables, good will and other similar items" could not be
financed by bond proceeds). Cf. Private Letter Ruling 8004043 (Oct. 30, 1979) (Revenue Rul-
ing 63-20's requirements met when bond proceeds reimburse a political subdivision for tem-
porary advances of funds used to acquire tangible property).
141. See Private Letter Ruling 7931026 (May 2, 1979); Private Letter Ruling 7931020 (May
2, 1979); Private Letter Ruling 7931013 (May 2, 1979); Private Letter Ruling 7931010 (May 2,
1979); Private Letter Ruling 7930177 (Apr. 30, 1979); Private Letter Ruling 7930159 (Apr. 30,
1979); Private Letter Ruling 7930158 (Apr. 30, 1979); Private Letter Ruling 7930157 (Apr. 30,
1979). But see Private Letter Ruling 8012112 (Dec. 31, 1979) (cost of rehabilitating houses and
moving them to a low income housing site constituted acquisition of tangible property).
142. Private Letter Ruling 7931026 (May 2, 1979).
143. Private Letter Ruling 7827030 (Apr. 6, 1978).
144. Private Letter Ruling 8004053 (Oct. 30, 1979). In Private Letter Ruling 8149037 (July
10, 1981), in which the 63-20 conditions were met, the Service declared that any excess bond
proceeds were to be "expended for costs that are chargeable to the capital account of the [cor-
poration]."
145. See Private Letter Ruling 8124074 (Mar. 18, 1981); Private Letter Ruling 7944086 (July
31, 1979); Private Letter Ruling 7944046 (Aug. 1, 1979); Private Letter Ruling 7906053 (Nov.
9, 1978).
146. See, e.g., Private Letter Ruling 7842013 (July 18, 1978). See also Private Letter Ruling
8125027 (Mar. 24, 1981) (interest due during construction period that was financed with bond
proceeds is chargeable to corporation's capital account under § 266 of the Internal Revenue
Code). To qualify for the IDB small issue exemption, the property must be depreciable. I.R.C.
§ 103(b)(6)(A)(i).
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Nor may the proceeds from a 63-20 financing be used "to provide for the
[corporation's] working capital in its daily operations." '1  This principle
was specifically stated in Revenue Procedure 82-26.41
Revenue Procedure 82-26 also states that all of the original proceeds and
investment proceeds must be used to provide tangible real or tangible per-
sonal property.1 4 9 Proceeds are considered to provide tangible property only
if the proceeds are (a) used to finance costs that a taxpayer must (i) charge
to the property's capital account or (ii) elect to charge to the capital ac-
count or (iii) elect to deduct instead of charging to the capital account, and
(b) used to fund a reasonably required reserve fund within the meaning of
section 103(c)(4) of the Code.'50
None of the published rulings specifically discussed use of the proceeds for
site acquisition. Nonetheless, numerous rulings qualify under Revenue Ruling
63-20 where real estate is so acquired 5 ' and such use is clearly encompassed
within the spirit of Revenue Ruling 63-20. Moreover, the proposed regula-
tions, in discussing a subdivision's "supervisory control" over an issuer,
specifically refer to the acquisition of real estate financed by the
proceeds.' 52
The Service also apparently requires that the financed facility be new.
Thus, the Service denied financing when the political subdivisions already
had the use of the facility. In so doing, the Service stated that "Revenue
Ruling 63-20 contemplates the issuance of bonds on behalf of a political
subdivision to provide facilities for use within such political subdivision
rather than to provide working capital." " Revenue Ruling 63-20 financing
was denied in this instance because the issuance of bonds would not provide
the county with new or different facilities. Rather, the county would con-
tinue to use the same property that it had used under long term leases. The
proposed 63-20 financing would only free up any capital not needed to pur-
chase the facility. Such use of the proceeds is not the intended purpose of
63-20 financing.
147. See Private Letter Ruling 8119061 (Feb. 13, 1981); Private Letter Ruling 8115095 (Jan.
19, 1981); Private Letter Ruling 7947084 (Aug. 24, 1979); Private Letter Ruling 7946014 (Aug.
15, 1979); Private Letter Ruling 7918050 (Jan. 30, 1979); Private Letter Ruling 7817130 (Jan.
30, 1978); Private Letter Ruling 7726066 (Apr. 5, 1977); Private Letter Ruling 7608139210A
(Aug. 13, 1976).
148. Rev. Proc. 82-26, § 3.052, 1982-17 I.R.B. 16, 19.
149. Id. The terms "original proceeds" and "investment proceeds" are defined in that sec-
tion.
150. Id. The Procedure provides further for a $5,000 de minimis amount and for maintain-
ing the exemption if excess proceeds were based on reasonable estimates and then are invested
in a prescribed manner.
151. See, e.g., Private Letter Ruling 8046031 (Aug. 19, 1980); Private Letter Ruling 8042050
(July 23, 1980).
152. See 41 Fed. Reg. 4829 (1976) (to be codified at Treas. Reg. § 1.103-1(c)(2)(iii)(c)(7))
(proposed Feb. 2, 1976).
153. Private Letter Ruling 7947084 (Aug. 24, 1979). See also Rev. Proc. 82-26, § 3.052,
1982-17 1.R.B. 16, 19. But see Private Letter Ruling 8034147 (May 30, 1980) (political subdivi-
sion that purchased an existing building, sold it to a 63-20 corporation and then leased the
building back, met Revenue Ruling 63-20 requirements).
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The purchase of equipment, inventory, and supplies also has been subject
to restrictions by the Service. The use of proceeds to purchase equipment
has been denied because of the unlikelihood that equipment would exist at
the time the obligations were to be paid and the property was to be given to
the political subdivision. ' In recent years, however, the Service has taken a
more realistic and flexible position. It has recognized that many projects are
useless unless the buildings are equipped. Accordingly, a number of the
published letter rulings have permitted 63-20 financings that involved the
purchase of equipment with the proceeds and that obligated the corporation
to repair, maintain, and replace such equipment." Thus, there would be
assurance that equipment would exist to be given to the subdivision upon
payment of the indebtedness. In some situations, a portion of the proceeds
were earmarked for a "Renewal and Replacement Fund." 516
The rationale that permits expenditures for equipment seem to apply to
expenditures for supplies and inventories. The few published rulings referr-
ing to such items, however, recite that 63-20 proceeds will not be used for
supplies and inventories.' 7 In contrast, several rulings indicate that
furnishings would be financed.' Perhaps, if there is adequate assurance of
replacement, the Service may be persuaded to permit expenditures of 63-20
proceeds for supplies and inventories.
Another area of restriction is the use of proceeds for prior, interim, and
additional issues. A financing apparently will qualify under Revenue Ruling
63-20 under some circumstances even if a portion of the proceeds may be
used to retire outstanding obligations (assuming those obligations also are
154. Nelson, supra note 29, at 945. See Private Letter Ruling 7605210220A (May 21, 1976).
155. See Private Letter Ruling 8034067 (May 29, 1980) (stated to be limited to eight percent
of proceeds); Private Letter Ruling 8005031 (Nov. 7, 1979) (project's equipment, purchased
from bond proceeds, required to be maintained, replaced where necessary, and conveyed to
County in good working condition); Private Letter Ruling 8115095 (Jan. 19, 1981) (hospital
would maintain and replace obsolete equipment acquired with the notes), amended by Private
Letter Ruling 8116088 (Jan. 23, 1981). See also Private Letter Ruling 8133057 (May 20, 1981)
(Service authorized subdivision's plan in which the corporation "reasonably expects to main-
tain and replace any obsoleted property" and further authorized a fund for the replacement of
the project or equipment); Private Letter Ruling 8304011 (Oct. 15, 1982) (hospital corporation
required to replace equipment); Private Letter Ruling 8305018 (Oct. 29, 1982) (corporation re-
quired to repair or replace obsolete or worn equipment).
156. See, e.g., Private Letter Ruling 7947065 (Aug. 22, 1979); Private Letter Ruling 7946014
(Aug. 15, 1979); Private Letter Ruling 7932071 (May 11, 1979); Private Letter Ruling 7926093
(Mar. 29, 1979).
157. See Private Letter Ruling 7842013 (July 18, 1978); Private Letter Ruling 7817130 (Jan.
30, 1978); Private Letter Ruling 7608139210A (Aug. 13, 1976); Private Letter Ruling
7605210220A (May 21, 1976).
158. See, e.g., Private Letter Ruling 8124074 (Mar. 18, 1981); Private Letter Ruling 7947065
(Aug. 22, 1979); Private Letter Ruling 7726066 (Apr. 15, 1977). Cf. Private Letter Ruling
7926093 (Mar. 29, 1979) (since county would receive full title to facilities, including furnishings
and equipment, when bonds were redeemed and county could exercise option to purchase
facilities at any time, Revenue Ruling 63-20's requirements were met).
[Vol. 31:533
REVENUE RULING 63-20
tax-exempt).5 9 If the outstanding obligations are not tax-exempt, refinanc-
ing will not qualify under Revenue Ruling 63-20. The Service reasoned that
otherwise, the obligations would not be "issued for the purpose intended by
Rev. Rul. 63-20, the providing of new or different facilities for the benefit
of [the] County. Instead, the purpose of the issuance will be to retire and
refinance [the] Hospital's previously issued Notes, obligations that were
incurred without the contemplation of eventual tax-exempt bond
financing." 160
Interim financing may qualify under Revenue Ruling 63-20 if it is part of a
unified financing arrangement clearly contemplating permanent financing."16
Thus, permissible interim financing would include instances in which the
political subdivisions cannot act quickly enough to arrange permanent
financing"12 or the financing only is necessary for the construction period." 63
Furthermore, if bond proceeds are used to reimburse a political subdivision
for temporary advances of funds that were used to acquire tangible property,
the Service has ruled that the proceeds would be considered necessary for
acquisition of tangible property rather than as providing working capital.',
It should be noted that the Service has issued proposed regulations'
revising section 1.103-7, the existing regulations relating to the advance
refunding of IDBs. The new regulations would prohibit most refundings
because, in part, they do not finance the acquisition, construction, or
reconstruction of property, but rather refinance an existing debt. Although
the proposed regulations do not apply specifically to "on behalf of" is-
suances or 63-20 financings, the Service stated in one 1978 private letter rul-
ing that "we are studying whether the underlying rationale applicable to the
proposed regulations should apply to advance refunding of '63-20' obliga-
tions." '" The Service then proceeded to apply the standards in the proposed
regulations to the 63-20 financing under consideration.
Refinancing appears permissible only if the maturity of the new financing
will not postpone the date on which the political subdivision is to receive
the property involved as set forth in the terms of the original 63-20 financ-
159. See, e.g., Private Letter Ruling 7904122 (Oct. 27, 1978); Private Letter Ruling 7835022
(May 30, 1978); Private Letter Ruling 6508165150A (Aug. 16, 1965).
160. Private Letter Ruling 7947037 (Aug. 22, 1979).
161. See Private Letter Ruling 8145078 (undated); Private Letter Ruling 8004043 (Oct. 30,
1979); Private Letter Ruling 7930120 (Apr. 27, 1979).
162. See, e.g., Private Letter Ruling 7930120 (Apr. 27, 1979) (because insufficient time to
secure bond-financed loan for purchase of school property, Service approved plans whereby
not-for-profit foundation would purchase land for resale to school district).
163. See, e.g., Private Letter Ruling 8145078 (undated) (Service approved 63-20 qualification
of Bond Anticipation Notes for interim construction financing of courthouse project).
164. See Private Letter Ruling 8034150 (May 30, 1980); Private Letter Ruling 8004043 (Oct.
30, 1979).
165. 42 Fed. Reg. 61,613 (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1) (proposed Dec. 6, 1977),
amended by 44 Fed. Reg. 7177 (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1) (proposed Feb. 7, 1979).
166. Private Letter Ruling 7824059 (Mar. 20, 1978).
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ing.' 6' This principle is consistent with the Service's requirement prohibiting
the extension of lease renewal options beyond the time the political subdivi-
sion will receive the title to the property."6 8
Similarly, additional financings that are secured by the same property
that secured the original financing are permitted only if the original
maturity dates are not extended.' 69 Thus, in one revenue ruling, a hospital
that financed an addition by issuing bonds that qualified under Revenue
Ruling 63-20 could refund these bonds in advance with 63-20 bonds because
title to the facilities would not vest in the sponsoring city later than the
original vesting date under the first bond issue.'70 The hospital, however,
could not later finance an addition with 63-20 bonds if it would have been
unable to amortize such bonds on or before the original maturity date. The
hospital accordingly proposed an arrangement, which the Service approved,
whereby a state Authority would issue its own tax-exempt bonds "on behalf
of" the city in which the hospital was located. Part of the proceeds were to
be escrowed during the construction and used to pay off the 63-20 bonds.
Upon such payoff, the hospital, which was the 63-20 corporation, would
deed all the original 63-20 financed property to the city, free and clear of
all encumbrances. The city then would lease all the property to the state
Authority under a ground lease for the duration of the Authority's bond
issue. The Authority, in turn, would lease the facilities to the hospital.
In Revenue Procedure 82-26, the Service now has stated that it ordinarily
will issue an advance ruling that refunding obligations are issued by a non-
profit corporation on behalf of a governmental unit, if four conditions are
met. '7 The conditions are: (1) that all of the original and investment pro-
ceeds (subject to certain exceptions) are used to pay the principal, qualified
167. See, e.g., Private Letter Ruling 8037107 (June 20, 1980). Cf. Private Letter Ruling
8004043 (Oct. 30, 1979) (corporation "will not issue any parity bonds to extend the term of the
bonds").
168. See infra text accompanying notes 255-63.
169. Nelson, supra note 29, at 945. See, e.g., Private Letter Ruling 8051121 (Sept. 26, 1980)
(series B Bonds issued to construct, equip, and acquire addition to nursing home facility co-
terminous with outstanding series A Bonds); Private Letter Ruling 8037107 (June 20, 1980)
(foundation increased amount of loan without increasing term of the note); Private Letter Rul-
ing 8015098 (Jan. 17, 1980) (if corporation issues additional bonds, final maturity of additional
bonds cannot be later than final maturity date of outstanding bonds); Private Letter Ruling
8007054 (Nov. 23, 1979) (repayment of additional funds borrowed for additional facility will
terminate on same date that the indebtedness incurred in connection with the original facility
matures).
Parity bonds for future expansion have been authorized, see Private Letter Ruling 8133057
(May 20, 1981); Private Letter Ruling 7907072 (Nov. 16, 1978); Private Letter Ruling 7906053
(Nov. 9, 1978), but such bonds may not extend the original maturity date, see Private Letter
Ruling 8004043 (Oct. 30, 1979). Cf. Private Letter Ruling 8145078 (undated) (there is no men-
tion of maturity dates of possible parity bonds). But see Private Letter Ruling 7605210220A
(May 21, 1976) (parity bonds authorized on condition that title to bonded facility not be en-
cumbered while bonds remain outstanding).
170. See Private Letter Ruling 8126050 (Mar. 31, 1981).
171. Rev. Proc. 82-26, § 4.01, 1982-17 I.R.B. 16, 20.
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interest and any premium on the prior issue, and to fund a reasonably re-
quired reserve fund; (2) that the obligations are not "advance refunding
obligations," which means obligations issued more than 180 days before the
date the prior obligations are discharged;' 73 however, the Service will give a
favorable ruling to "advance refunding obligations" if the governmental
unit has exclusive possession and use of a portion of the financed property
equal to ninety-five percent of the fair rental value for the life of the
obligations; 7 4 (3) that the refunding obligations will be discharged no later
than the latest maturity date of the original obligations,7 , except that this
requirement is waived if the governmental unit has the beneficial interest in
the corporation specified by section 3.041(a) of the Revenue Procedure;' 7"
and (4) most of the general operating rules of section 3 of Revenue Pro-
cedure 82-26 are met.177
b. Beneficial Interest While Indebtedness Outstanding
In addition to restricting the use of 63-20 proceeds, Revenue Ruling 63-20
requires that the political subdivision have a beneficial interest in the cor-
poration while the indebtedness remains outstanding. This requirement has
been reflected in the private letter rulings in many ways, and certain of
those conditions are now contained in Revenue Procedure 82-26.
Under section 3.04 of Revenue Procedure 82-26, this beneficial interest
requirement is met if any of the following three conditions exist:
(a) the governmental unit has "exclusive beneficial possession and use of
the portion of the property financed by the obligations and additions to
that property equivalent to [ninety-five] percent or more of its fair rental
value for the life of the obligations" (including other obligations issued by
the corporation in connection with the property to make improvements or
to refund a prior issue of obligations).' 7 This condition appears for the
first time in Revenue Procedure 82-26 and is not mentioned in any of the
prior private letter rulings.
(b)(1) the corporation has that amount of "exclusive beneficial possession
and use,"' 7 and (2) the governmental unit on whose behalf the nonprofit
corporation is issuing the obligations (A) appoints or approves the appoint-
ment of at least eighty percent of the members of the corporation's govern-
ing board and (B) has the power to remove for cause, either directly or
through judicial proceedings any member of that board and appoint a suc-
cessor."' However, if the corporation's articles of incorporation provide
172. Id. § 4.011.
173. Id. § 4.012.
174. Id. § 4.012 (referring to § 3.041(a) of the Procedure).
175. Id. § 4.013.
176. Id.
177. Id. § 4.014.
178. Rev. Proc. 82-26, § 3.041(a), 1982-17 I.R.B. 16, 18.
179. Id. § 3.041(b)(1).
180. Id. § 3.041(b)(2).
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that ex officio representatives of the governmental unit constitute all or a
part of the membership of the board, then the requirements of (A) and (B)
do not apply to the ex officio members.' 8 ' This condition, while perhaps
hinted at in prior published private letter rulings, also imposes requirements
far beyond those enunciated in the prior rulings." '
(c) The governmental unit has the right at any time to obtain unen-
cumbered fee title and exclusive possession of the property financed by the
obligations, and any additions to the property, by (1) placing into escrow
an amount sufficient to defease the obligations, and (2) paying reasonable
costs incident to the defeasance.'"1 To preserve the governmental unit's
right to obtain title, the unit generally is prohibited from contracting in ad-
vance to convey any interest in the property for periods after the defeasance
of the obligations. The governmental unit specifically is prohibited from
contracting to convey a fee interest to any user of the property (as defined
in § 103(b)(6)(C) of the Code) before the defeasance within ninety days
after the unit defeases the obligations. 8 ' This condition builds on principles
clearly reflected in the prior private letter rulings. If the governmental unit
exercises its right at any time to obtain unencumbered title, the property
must be conveyed as unencumbered as is necessary in the ordinary discharge
of the obligations.'
If the first condition'86 has not been met, then, in addition to meeting
one of the other two conditions, the financing also must provide that if the
nonprofit corporation defaults in its payments under the obligations, the
governmental unit has an exclusive option to purchase the property financ-
ed by the obligations (and any additions to that property) for the amount
of the outstanding indebtedness and accrued interest to the date of
default.' 7
The conditions imposed in Revenue Procedure 82-26 are ambiguous to
some extent. As with Revenue Ruling 63-20, the prior private letter rulings
may be helpful in understanding the Service's views.
The meaning in Revenue Procedure 82-26 of the term "exclusive benefi-
cial possession and use"'8 8 is not clear. The prior private letter rulings gen-
181. Id.
182. See infra notes 196-203 and accompanying text.
183. Rev. Proc. 82-26, § 3.041(c), 1982-17 I.R.B. 16, 18.
184. Id. The reference to the 90-day period is ambiguous, and thus fosters confu-
sion. If it means merely that the transfer must be delayed at least 90 days from defeasance, it
would contradict the principle that there should be no contracting in advance. Similarly, if the
reference means that the conveyee could not have been a user within 90 days before the
defeasance, it contradicts the same principle, because the governmental unit, immediately after
defeasance, should be free to contract with anyone.
185. Id. Compare id. § 3.053 with infra notes 227-35 & 253-65 and accompanying text.
186. See supra text accompanying note 178.
187. Rev. Proc. 82-26, § 3.042, 1982-17 I.R.B. 16, 18.




erally implied that either the corporation or political subdivision would have
exclusive possession and use, but did not specifically state that. As dis-
cussed above,' 9 under Revenue Ruling 63-20 private parties always have
been permitted to be lessees, managers, and operators of 63-20 financed
facilities, and they could make profits out of these arrangements. Thus,
where the corporation or political subdivision initially had full control and
then chose to enter into such arrangements, the language in Revenue Pro-
cedure 82-26 does not seem to be an attempt to prohibit these ar-
rangements. If the Service had desired that result, it probably would have
stated so more clearly. Rather, the language seems an effort to insure that
the corporation or political subdivision does have full control initially.
Under Revenue Procedure 82-26, "use" by an instrumentality of a
governmental unit will be considered "use" by that unit if that instrumen-
tality is an instrumentality of only the governmental unit on whose behalf
the obligations are issued and the requirements of Revenue Ruling 57-128"1°
are otherwise met.' 9 ' This language is unclear. If to be an instrumentality of
a governmental unit means to be chartered by the governmental unit, then
very few instrumentalities will qualify.' 92 If to be an instrumentality means
to have limiting charter provisions, then most nonprofit corporations could
be structured to qualify.'93
In one private letter ruling exemplifying the Service's concern that the
subdivision have the use of the property, the city sponsoring the 63-20
bonds and using the facility only had a one-year lease of the property.'
94
Although the city had the option to terminate the rental at the end of the
lease, it automatically renewed the lease each year. The Service, however,
seemed unsure that the city maintained a sufficient beneficial interest
through such an arrangement. Thus, the Service required a representation
that "[tihe City fully intends to renew each year its lease with the Authority
(the 63-20 corporation) relative to the facility involved herein." '91
The requirement of section 3.041(b)(2) that the political subdivision con-
trol the board is much more specific and restrictive than the requirements
previously expressed in the published private letter rulings. While some
degree of control always seemed to be recited, rulings generally do not
specify that the political subdivision must possess any particular control
over the 63-20 corporation. For example, in those rulings the subdivision's
governing body might either elect or approve the corporations' members,
9 6
189. See supra text accompanying notes 24-25.
190. 1957-1 C.B. 311.
191. ReV. Proc. 82-26, § 3.041(a), 1982-17 I.R.B. 16, 18.
192. See supra text accompanying notes 53-54.
193. See supra text accompanying notes 54-55.
194. Private Letter Ruling 7608139210A (Aug. 13, 1976).
195. Id.
196. See Private Letter Ruling 8204180 (Oct. 30, 1981); Private Letter Ruling 8004034 (Oct.
30, 1979); infra notes 213-15 and accompanying text. Some rulings have approved arrangements
in which the corporation's membership certificates were transferred to a trustee and held in a
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directors, 97 articles of incorporation,'98 bylaws,' 9  expenditures, or budget.200
In some instances, officials of the political subdivision also may serve as of-
ficials of the 63-20 corporation. 0 ' Such control by the political subdivision
might occur only at the creation of the corporation, 02 or this control of the
corporation might continue. 203
The proposed regulations are even more restrictive than Revenue Pro-
cedure 82-26 in requiring the political subdivision to generally control the
governing board of the corporation. Under those regulations, the board
must be composed entirely of: (i) subdivision public officials who serve ex-
officio, but for no longer than their term in public office; or (ii) persons
elected by the voters for a specified term; or (iii) persons appointed by
other members of the board who are in the first two categories."' Board
members in the third category would have to be removable at will with no
appointment exceeding six years.20 5 However, if the subdivision does not
trust for the political subdivision. See, e.g., Private Letter Ruling 8032046 (May 13, 1980);
Private Letter Ruling 8008034 (Nov. 27, 1979); Private Letter Ruling 7944046 (Aug. 1, 1979);
Private Letter Ruling 7835075 (June 1, 1978); Private Letter Ruling 7827027 (Apr. 6, 1978).
197. See, e.g., Private Letter Ruling 8245073 (Aug. 13, 1982); Private Letter Ruling 8226058
(Mar. 30, 1982); Private Letter Ruling 8211028 (Dec. 15, 1981). See infra notes 213-15 and ac-
companying text. Unpublished Private Letter Ruling 7012030301A (Dec. 3, 1970) has been
cited by some attorneys as requiring the subdivision to have control over the appointment of
directors. "Members" or "Directors" may be used synonomously in different rulings because
of the variations in corporate structures under different states' not-for-profit corporation laws.
Generally, reference to either probably should be construed as references to the controlling per-
sons.
198. See Private Letter Ruling 8247081 (Aug. 25, 1982); Private Letter Ruling 815212 (Oct.
5, 1981). See generally infra note 209 and accompanying text.
199. See Private Letter Ruling 8152124 (Oct. 5, 1981); Private Letter Ruling 8124149 (Mar.
23, 1981).
200. See Private Letter Ruling 7918053 (Jan. 30, 1979) (expenditures); Private Letter Ruling
7836023 (June 7, 1978) (budget).
201. See, e.g., Private Letter Ruling 8034147 (May 30, 1978).
202. Prior to the issuance of the bonds, a municipality may exercise control by approving
the development of the project, approving the articles of incorporation, and confirming the ap-
pointment of the initial board of directors. See, e.g., Private Letter Ruling 8152124 (Oct. 5,
1981); Private Letter Ruling 8124149 (Mar. 23, 1981). See also Private Letter Ruling 7836023
(June 7, 1978) (municipality exercises control through approving initial board of directors and
approving initial funding of the corporation).
203. For rulings involving the continuing control of members, see Private Letter Ruling
8034150 (May 30, 1980); Private Letter Ruling 8034147 (May 30, 1980); Private Letter Ruling
8024114 (Mar. 18, 1980); Private Letter Ruling 8022058 (Mar. 5, 1980); Private Letter Ruling
8005031 (Nov. 7, 1979); Private Letter Ruling 8004043 (Oct. 30, 1979); Private Letter Ruling
7944046 (Aug. 1, 1979). For continuing control of directors, see Private Letter Ruling 8226058
(Mar. 30, 1982); Private Letter Ruling 7947065 (Aug. 22, 1979); Private Letter Ruling 7921058
(Feb. 26, 1979); Private Letter Ruling 7829133 (Apr. 24, 1978); Private Letter Ruling 7827030
(Apr. 6, 1978); Private Letter Ruling 7815014 (Jan. 11, 1978); Private Letter Ruling 7726066
(Apr. 5, 1977). For continuing control of both members and directors, see Private Letter Rul-
ing 7911097 (Dec. 18, 1978); Private Letter Ruling 7907072 (Nov. 16, 1978); Private Letter
Ruling 7906053 (Nov. 9, 1978).




have "organizational control," a majority of the :members of the corpora-
tion's governing body must be in the first two categories.
As previously stated, the proposed regulations also require that the sub-
division have "organizational control" or "supervisory control" over the
corporation.0 Organizational control would include the right to "at its sole
discretion, and at any time, alter or change the structure, organization, pro-
grams or activities" of the issuing corporation.2"7 Such control also would
include the power to terminate the corporation.2 8 Supervisory control of
the issuer would ordinarily include approval of, and power to amend, the
issuer's governing instrument and bylaws, 20 9 annual approval and post-
review of the issuer's programs and expenditures, 21 0 annual review of its
financial statements," ' and access at any time to its books and records. 2 2
An early unpublished private letter ruling has been cited for the proposi-
tion that the political subdivision is required to have control over the ap-
pointment of directors." 3 In a more recent ruling, the Service relied upon
the proposed regulations to determine that the issuer, a state university, was
neither a political subdivision nor an issuer "on behalf of" a subdivision. ' 4
In discussing the "on behalf of" requirement, the Service stated that an
"on behalf of" entity acts as an agent or alter ego of the political subdivi-
sion in the issuance of obligations. The Service observed that "[t]his rela-
tionship, or nexus, exists when the state or political subdivision possesses
organizational or supervisory control over the activities of the issuing
entity." 2"' Concluding that the proposed regulations merely codified re-
quirements of prior revenue rulings, control was determined on the basis of
whether a state or political subdivision had the right to select the members
of the governing body of the issuing entity. Thus, in seeking qualification
under Revenue Ruling 63-20, it would appear useful to give the sponsoring
political subdivision as many as possible of the elements of control
enumerated in Revenue Procedure 82-26 and in the proposed regulations.
As is now reflected in section 3.041(c) of Revenue Procedure 82-26, the
Service has long insisted on a provision granting the political subdivision
the option to purchase the financed property at any time at a price suffi-
206. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
207. 41 Fed. Reg. 4830 (1976) (to be codified at Treas. Reg. § 1.103-1(c)(2)(iii)(B)(3)) (pro-
posed Feb. 2, 1976).
208. Id.
209. Id. (to be codified at Treas. Reg. § 1.103-1(c)(2)(iii)(C)(1)) (proposed Feb. 2, 1976). Cf.
Private Letter Ruling 8136055 (June ii, 1981) (the fifth requirement of Rev. Rul. 63-20 man-
dating approval of the corporation by the political subdivision was fulfilled because bylaws of
the corporation provide that any activities of corporation must be "specifically approved" by
political subdivision).
210. 41 Fed. Reg. 4830 (1976) (to be codified at Treas. Reg. § 1.103-1(c)(2)(iii)(C)(2)) (pro-
posed Feb. 2, 1976).
211. Id. (to be codified at Treas. Reg. § 1.103-1(c)(2)(iii)(C)(4)) (proposed Feb. 2, 1976).
212. Id. (to be codified at Treas. Reg. § 1.103-1(c)(2)(iii)(C)(5)) (proposed Feb. 2, 1976).
213. See Private Letter Ruling 7012030301A (Dec. 3, 1970).
214. Private Letter Ruling 8119061 (Feb. 13, 1981).
215. Id.
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cient to ietire the indebtedness." 6 Almost all of the published rulings cite
the existence of such a provision.21 Such a provision helps ensure that the
subdivision ultimately will receive full legal title. The principle has been so
embedded in the private letter rulings that the occasional omission of such a
recitation2 ' or variation 21' seems insignificant. However, the specification
in Revenue Procedure 82-26 of the escrow arrangement 2 0 is new and may
be less restrictive than arrangements recited in the prior private letter rul-
ings. Many such arrangements implied that the obtaining of possession and
the defeasing of the obligations should occur promptly.
The option expressed in section 3.042 of Revenue Procedure 82-26 per-
mitting the political subdivision to purchase the property upon default is
consistent with the Service's prior position. The political subdivision was
granted a similar right in prior private letter rulings "in the event of a
default under the [bond] Indenture" to fully pay the bonds and acquire
ownership of the project.22 ' Sometimes this was an exclusive right. 222 In a
number of the rulings qualifying under Revenue Ruling 63-20, the time in
which the subdivision may exercise that right was limited. For example, the
subdivision might have thirty days in which to exercise its option and sixty
days within which to perfect its purchase. 23 Revenue Procedure 82-26 now
216. Nelson, supra note 29, at 946.
217. See, e.g., Private Letter Ruling 8104136 (Oct. 30, 1980); Private Letter Ruling 8034067
(Mar. 29, 1980); Private Letter Ruling 7944086 (July 31, 1979); Private Letter Ruling 7827030
(Apr. 6, 1978); Private Letter Ruling 7741037 (July 18, 1977); Private Letter Ruling
7608139210A (Aug. 13, 1976); Private Letter Ruling 7409240390A (Sept. 24, 1974). Sometimes
a ruling will recite a price sufficient "to retire any notes, bonds, or other obligations of the
corporation then outstanding." See Private Letter Ruling 7907072 (Nov. 16, 1978). One ruling
recognized that it was permissible for the state to have the right to purchase the financed pro-
perty when it took title "for the use and benefit" of the subdivision. Private Letter Ruling
8007054 (Nov. 23, 1979).
218. See Private Letter Ruling 7827030 (Apr. 6, 1978) (on maturity political subdivision was
"obligated" to purchase acquired assets at value of loans plus interest).
219. See Private Letter Ruling 8116088 (June 23, 1981) (subdivision "can purchase the pro-
ject at anytime by assuming the outstanding indebtedness"); Private Letter Ruling 8007054
(Nov. 23, 1979) (subdivision can purchase the facility on "any rental payment date"); Private
Letter Ruling 7807076 (Nov. 21, 1977) (subdivision "has a continuous right to acquire the
property . . . through either discharging or assuming the corporate indebtedness").
In one ruling the subdivision could purchase "any part" of the project. Private Letter Rul-
ing 8121170 (Mar. 2, 1981). The option price was "equal to the aggregate amount for the en-
tire remaining term of the facility lease of the part of the total rent attributable to such part of
the project," which seems to equate the rent to the indebtedness. Id. (emphasis added). In
another ruling, the subdivision could purchase the project "subject to the lease." Private Let-
ter Ruling 7409240390A (Sept. 24, 1974).
220. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
221. See, e.g., Private Letter Ruling 7918054 (Jan. 30, 1979).
222. Private Letter Ruling 7608139210A (Aug. 13, 1976).
223. See Private Letter Ruling 8017124 (Jan. 31, 1980); Private Letter Ruling 8012112 (Dec.
31, 1979); Private Letter Ruling 8003102 (Oct. 26, 1979); Private Letter Ruling 7907072 (Nov.
16, 1978). In one instance, the time permitted to exercise the option was 180 days. Private Let-
ter Ruling 8133057 (May 20, 1981).
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specifies a permissible time limit. The governmental unit shall have not less
than ninety days from the date it is notified by the nonprofit corporation of
the default in which to exercise the option, and not less than ninety days
from the date it exercises the option to purchase the property.22'
The proposed regulations, as an element of "supervisory control" by the
political subdivision, provide that "in the event of default with respect to
obligations issued to finance the acquisition of property, the [subdivision]
has the exclusive option to purchase such property for the amount required
to discharge such obligations and is provided a reasonable time to exercise
such option."' 2 Both Revenue Procedure 82-26's and the proposed regula-
tions' imposition of a time limit within which to exercise such an option
seem to back off from the Service's apparent general position that an op-
tion to purchase be exercisable "at any time."226
A number of the private letter rulings also recite that while the in-
debtedness is outstanding there will be no liens or encumbrances227 on the
property other than mortgages and security interests needed to secure 63-20
financing. 2 8 It is not clear whether this is part of the Service's beneficial in-
terest requirement or simply a reflection of the boilerplate language in
financing instruments.
Alternatively, the further requirement that the property be free of encum-
brances when given to the subdivision 2 9 implies that liens would be per-
missible until such time. In one ruling, for example, the Service relied upon
a representation that the term "permitted encumbrances," as defined in the
trust agreement, would "have no application to the full, unincumbered [sic]
title to the project which will be transferred to the City upon its option to
purchase, or upon the complete discharge or payment of the bonds." 23 0 In
other rulings, liens were prohibited "excepting sewer assessments' 239 1 or
"any necessary easements for public convenience." 232 Yet, if the subdivi-
sion has the right to acquire the property at any time and if its ultimate ac-
quisition must be lien-free, it is arguable that the property must be kept
lien-free at all times. Presumably a reasonable time to clear newly-incurred
liens would be allowed.
Many of the published private letter rulings also recite that title
224. Rev. Proc. 82-26, § 3.042, 1982-17 I.R.B. 16, 18.
225. 41 Fed. Reg. 4830 (1976) (to be codified at Treas. Reg. § 1.103-1(c)(2)(iii)(C)(6)) (pro-
posed Feb. 2, 1976).
226. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
227. See Private Letter Ruling 8104136 (Oct. 30, 1980); Private Letter Ruling 8003102 (Oct.
26, 1979); Private Letter Ruling 7907072 (Nov. 16, 1978).
228. See, e.g., Private Letter Ruling 8102048 (Oct. 16, 1980); Private Letter Ruling 8046031
(Aug. 19, 1980); Private Letter Ruling 7946014 (Aug. 15, 1979); Private Letter Ruling 7836023
(June 7, 1978); Private Letter Ruling 7748017 (Aug. 30, 1977).
229. See infra notes 254-63 and accompanying text.
230. Private Letter Ruling 7607713921A (1976).
231. Private Letter Ruling 7605210220A (May 21, 1976).
232. Private Letter Ruling 8003102 (Oct. 26, 1979). See also Rev. Proc. 82-26, § 3.041(c)
(permitting certain encumbrances).
19821
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW [Vol. 31:533
documents would be placed with an escrowee or trustee for the benefit of
the subdivision while the indebtedness was outstanding. '33 This procedure
can both secure the property to the holders of the indebtedness and ensure
ultimate conveyance to the subdivision. Again, it is unclear whether the
procedure is merely sound commercial practice or whether it is a Service re-
quirement. In other rulings, the corporation's membership certificates also
were held by a trustee or escrowee for the benefit of the subdivision while
the obligations were outstanding.23 As another element of "supervisory
control" by the political subdivision, the proposed regulations would re-
quire that such an escrow be established to convey title upon retirement of
the indebtedness.233
c. Title Upon Retirement of the Indebtedness
In addition to project restrictions and the beneficial interest requirement,
Revenue Ruling 63-20 requires that the political subdivision obtain full legal
title to the financed property upon the retirement of the indebtedness. The
published private letter rulings indicate that the mode of transfer to the sub-
division may vary. For example, transfer may be effected through the cor-
poration's articles of incorporation, '2 3  by gift2 37 or deed, 238 through the
bond indenture239 or the lease,2"' or by unspecified means. 24 1 Many rulings
talk of the property as being "tendered." Regardless of the mode of
transfer, the subdivision must obtain control of the property upon retire-
ment of the indebtedness.24 2
Thus, the Service has denied 63-20 qualification, in part, because legal title
233. See Private Letter Ruling 7836023 (June 7, 1978); Private Letter Ruling 7835075 (June
1, 1978).
234. See Private Letter Ruling 8032046 (May 13, 1980); Private Letter Ruling 8015098 (June
17, 1980); Private Letter Ruling 8005031 (Nov. 7, 1979).
235. See 41 Fed. Reg. 4830 (1976) (to be codified at Treas. Reg. § 1.103-1(c)(2)(iii)(C)(7))
(proposed Feb. 2, 1976).
236. See Private Letter Ruling 8142041 (July 21, 1981); Private Letter Ruling 8051121 (Sept.
26, 1980); Private Letter Ruling 7947065 (Aug. 22, 1979); Private Letter Ruling 7737009 (June
14, 1977).
237. See Private Letter Ruling 7947065 (Aug. 22, 1979); Private Letter Ruling 7946014 (Aug.
15, 1979); Private Letter Ruling 7926093 (Mar. 29, 1979).
238. See Private Letter Ruling 7836023 (June 7, 1978).
239. See Private Letter Ruling 8038131 (June 27, 1980).
240. See Private Letter Ruling 8032046 (May 13, 1980).
241. See Private Letter Ruling 7944086 (July 31, 1979) "[aill property of the Corporation
will vest in, and become the property of the District . . . upon the District's payment of an
amount sufficient to retire the then existing principal and interest of the bonds").
242. See, e.g., Private Letter Ruling 8102048 (Oct. 16, 1980); Private Letter Ruling 7944046
(Aug. 1, 1979). It is interesting to note that early 63-20 transactions provided that a lessee
would have an automatic purchase option over the property (in an amount sufficient to retire
the bonds) if the interest was ruled to be not tax-exempt. This was prohibited by the I.R.S.,
however, in part on the theory that the right of the political subdivision to take full legal title
to the property should not be jeopardized by any changes in federal tax law. See Nelson, supra
note 29, at 946.
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would vest in another nonprofit corporation rather than in the subdivision.243
In one ruling, the requirement was not met because the corporation was
authorized to sell its property to private industry. 4 4 In a later ruling,
however, where state law permitted a city to donate property to a nonprofit
corporation for public purposes, the 63-20 corporation could have required
the subdivision to deed the facilifies to a nonprofit corporation.24 5 In this si-
tuation, Revenue Ruling 63-20 financing was approved because the non-
profit corporation was obligated to keep the facilities available to the pub-
lic. In contrast, the Service in a more recent ruling denied 63-20 qualifica-
tion for a university's obligations even though the university's board of
trustees held title to the university's property in trust for the people of the
state.21 6  Although the university urged that the state thereby had a
beneficial interest in the university, the Service stated that the "holding of
property 'in trust' by [the university] is not equivalent to full legal title
vesting in [the state]." 247
The proposed regulations, as an element of supervisory control," 8 and
Revenue Procedure 82-26249 also require full legal title to vest in the
political subdivision.
Under Revenue Procedure 82-26, seven conditions must be met to fulfill
the requirement that the political subdivision obtain full legal title to the
property upon the retirement of the indebtedness:
(1) The obligations of the nonprofit corporation must be issued on
behalf of no more than one governmental unit and unencumbered fee title
must be vested solely in that unit when the obligations are discharged. 5 0
This condition is consistent with the Service's prior positions when multiple
governmental units were involved.25 '
(2) All of the original proceeds and investment proceeds must be used to
provide tangible property.52
(3) The governmental unit must obtain unencumbered fee title and ex-
243. See Private Letter Ruling 8028016 (Apr. 15, 1980).
244. Private Letter Ruling 6701305540A (Jan. 30, 1967).
245. See Private Letter Ruling 8038183 (June 30, 1980).
246. Private Letter Ruling 8119061 (Feb. 13, 1981).
247. Id.
248. See 41 Fed. Reg. 4830 (1976) (to be codified at Treas. Reg. § 1.103-1(c)(2)(iii)(c)(7))
(proposed Feb. 2, 1976).
249. Rev. Proc. 82-26, § 3.05, 1982-17 I.R.B. 16, 20. Compare id. with I.R.C. § 103(b)(6)(K)
(implying that financed facilities located in more than one state can qualify for an 1DB "small
issue" exemption).
250. Rev. Proc. 82-26, § 3.051, 1982-17 I.R.B. 16, 20. This paragraph also states that
obligations are "discharged" when (a) cash is available at the place of payment on the date
that the obligations are due (whether at maturity or upon prior call for redemption) and (b) in-
terest ceases to accrue on the obligations.
251. See Private Letter Ruling 7837041 (June 15, 1978); Private Letter Ruling 7817086 (Jan.
27, 1978); Private Letter Ruling 7409110390A (Sept. 11, 1974). See also supra notes 88-91 and
accompanying text.
252. Rev. Proc. 82-26, § 3.052, 1982-17 I.R.B. 16, 19. See supra text accompanying notes
140-50.
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clusive possession and use of the property financed, including any addi-
tions, without demand or further action on its part.2"3
The absence of liens and encumbrances always has been a requirement. 24
The Revenue Procedure states that, for example, all leases, management
contracts, and other encumbrances must terminate upon discharge of the
obligations.2 " The published private letter rulings also have made it clear
that all leases, ' 5 6 subleases, 2  and management contracts25 8  affecting the
property must terminate upon retirement of the indebtedness. Although not
explicitly stated in any of the published private letter rulings, it appears that
the lease must be cancelled at the time title passes rather than merely be ter-
minable. For example, 63-20 qualification was denied when the tenant
sought a post-retirement non-disturbance agreement. " '9 Under the proposed
regulations, lease renewals and lease extensions exercisable by any person
other than the political subdivision are cited as examples of title encum-
brances that are prohibited beyond the date of the retirement of the in-
debtedness.2 60 Some of the private letter rulings, however, recite that the
subdivision may receive title at the earlier of the expiration of the original
lease or the retirement of the indebtedness26' or the expiration of the site
lease from the subdivision.2 6 2 If title vests upon the expiration of the lease
or site lease but before the retirement of the indebtedness, it would seem
permissible for mortgages and security interests to remain attached until the
indebtedness is retired. This proposition, however, is not stated in the
private letter rulings. The proposed regulations, as one element of super-
visory control, require that title be transferred "free of encumbrances
created subsequent to the acquisition of the property" by the corporation. 65
253. Rev. Proc. 82-26, § 3.053, 1982-17 I.R.B. 16, 19.
254. See, e.g., Private Letter Ruling 8046031 (Aug. 19, 1980); Private Letter Ruling 7947065
(Aug. 22, 1979).
255. Rev. Proc. 82-26, § 3.053, 1982-17 I.R.B. 16, 19.
256. See Private Letter Ruling 8152124 (Oct. 5, 1981); Private Letter Ruling 8142041 (July
21, 1981); Private Letter Ruling 8038131 (June 27, 1980); Private Letter Ruling 8038117 (June
27, 1980); Private Letter Ruling 8029033 (Apr. 22, 1980). See also infra note 293 (options).
257. See Private Letter Ruling 7911097 (Dec. 18, 1978).
258. See Private Letter Ruling 8152124 (Oct. 5, 1981); Private Letter Ruling 8115095 (Jan.
19, 1981).
259. See Private Letter Ruling 8047033 (Aug. 27, 1980) (repealing Private Letter Ruling
8029033 (Apr. 22, 1980)).
260. See 41 .Fed. Reg. 4830 (1976) (to be codified at Treas. Reg. § 1.103-1(c)(2)(iii)(C)(7))
(proposed Feb. 2, 1976).
261. See Private Letter Ruling 8121170 (Mar. 2, 1981); Private Letter Ruling 8121124 (Feb.
27, 1981); Private Letter Ruling 8104136 (Oct. 30, 1980); Private Letter Ruling 7951099 (Sept.
21, 1979); Private Letter Ruling 7944046 (Aug. 1, 1979); Private Letter Ruling 7915062 (Jan.
15, 1979); Private Letter Ruling 7911097 (Dec. 18, 1978); Private Letter Ruling 7907072 (Nov.
16, 1978); Private Letter Ruling 7906053 (Nov. 9, 1978).
262. See, e.g., Private Letter Ruling 8226058 (Mar. 30, 1982); Private Letter Ruling 7928013
(Apr. 10, 1979).
263. 41 Fed. Reg. 4830 (1976) (to be codified at Treas. Reg. § 1.103-1(c)(2)(iii)(C)(7)) (pro-
posed Feb. 2, 1976).
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Under Revenue Procedure 82-26, encumbrances that do not significantly
interfere with the enjoyment of the property, such as most easements
granted to utility companies, are not considered encumbrances for the pur-
poses of the condition that full legal title vest in the political subdivision.2 64
The Procedure further prescribes that if the 63-20 corporation sells interim
financing in anticipation of selling permanent financing for the governmen-
tal unit, the condition is met if (a) the unit receives the requisite title and
possession upon discharge of the permanent financing and (b) the last
short-term issue is discharged within five years after the date the first short-
term issue is issued.2 65
(4) Before the obligations are issued, the governmental unit must adopt
a resolution stating that it will accept title to the property financed by the
obligations, including any additions to that property, when the obligations
are discharged. 266 This condition reflects numerous private letter rulings that
also have recited (but did not specifically require) that the political subdivi-
sion, prior to the financing, agreed to accept the property upon the retire-
ment of the indebtedness. 26 In at least one ruling, the Service conditioned
63-20 qualification upon such a prior agreement.2 68 Acceptance in advance
is consistent with the requirement that the subdivision receive the property
upon retirement of the indebtedness. The proposed regulations also require
acceptance in advance as another element of supervisory control.2 69
(5) As indicated in the published private letter rulings, 2 0 subsequent
obligations issued to make improvements or to refund prior obligations
must be discharged no later than the maturity date of the original obliga-
tions.2 ' The Revenue Procedure now states that this restriction must be
contained in the indenture or other financing documents of the original
obligations. 272 Similarly, the maturity date of the original obligations may
not be extended beyond the latest original maturity date of those obliga-
tions. " 3 However, this condition is waived if the governmental unit (not the
corporation) has exclusive beneficial possession and use of a portion of the
property equivalent to ninety-five percent of its fair rental value during the
life of the obligations. 7 '
264. Rev. Proc. 82-26, § 3.053, 1982-17 1.R.B. 16, 19. Cf. § 3.041(c).
265. Id.
266. Id. § 3.054.
267. See, e.g., Private Letter Ruling 8124149 (Mar. 23, 1981); Private Letter Ruling 8032046
(May 13, 1980); Private Letter Ruling 7921058 (Feb. 26, 1979); Private Letter Ruling 7829123
(Apr. 24, 1978); Private Letter Ruling 7741037 (July 18, 1977). One ruling asserted that the
political subdivision "unequivocally" agreed to accept the project when the bonds were retired.
Private Letter Ruling 8133057 (May 20, 1981).
268. See Private Letter Ruling 8051121 (Sept. 26, 1980).
269. 41 Fed. Reg. 4830 (1976) (to be codified at Treas. Reg. § 1.103-1(c)(2)(iii)(C)(7)) (pro-
posed Feb. 2, 1976).
270. See supra notes 167-70 and accompanying text.
271. Rev. Proc. 82-26, § 3.055, 1982-17 I.R.B. 16, 19.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id. See id. § 3.041(a); supra text accompanying note 178.
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Just slightly prior to its issuance of Revenue Procedure 82-26 on April
26, 1982, the Service issued a private letter ruling dated March 30, 1982,
refusing to express an opinion on the issuance of an additional series of
bonds after those that were the subject of the ruling.2 ' The Service stated
that it "is presently studying the tax consequences of an extension of the
date on which full legal title to the facility vests in the governmental unit as
a result of a subsequent bond issue." 21 6 Whether Revenue Procedure 82-26
stated the conclusion of that study or whether the study is continuing is not
certain.
(6) The proceeds of fire or other casualty insurance received in connec-
tion with damage or destruction to the property financed must, subject to
the claims of the holders of the obligations, (a) be used to reconstruct the
property, regardless of whether the insurance proceeds are sufficient to pay
for the reconstruction, or (b) be remitted to the governmental unit.277 Until
Revenue Procedure 82-26, the question of damage or insurance was men-
tioned only in two published private letter rulings.27' The first ruling merely
recited the fact that "[i]n the event of damage or destruction to the
facilities, the lessee (63-20 corporation) is required to reconstruct them with
the insurance proceeds, even if the proceeds are not sufficient." 27 One more
recent ruling, issued after Revenue Procedure 82-26, recited that any in-
surance proceeds would be used to reconstruct the project or would be
remitted to the sponsoring city.280 The reference in the Revenue Procedure
to insufficient insurance proceeds implies answers to several hitherto
unresolved questions. Apparently, a favorable 63-20 ruling will not be
jeopardized by the failure to have adequate insurance or by the failure to
rebuild. Thus, due to a lack of insurance, the governmental unit, in effect,
may not have a beneficial interest in the project. Lack of insurance also
could leave the governmental unit with either bare land or land with ruins
which the unit might be forced to clear. Similarly, if the governmental unit
receives insurance proceeds rather than a rebuilt project, the unit, in effect,
receives only working capital which otherwise would disqualify the financ-
ing under Revenue Ruling 63-20.21 '
Other questions remain unresolved. Is the choice that is permitted in
Revenue Procedure 82-26-to rebuild or to remit the proceeds-to be made
by the 63-20 corporation or by the governmental unit? Is that choice an
275. Private Letter Ruling 8226058 (Mar. 30, 1982).
276. Id.
277. Rev. Proc. 82-26, § 3.056, 1982-17 I.R.B. 16, 19.
278. Private Letter Ruling 8145078 (undated); Private Letter Ruling 8142041 (July 2,
1981). After Rev. Proc. 82-26, Private Letter Ruling 8305018 (Oct. 29, 1982) recited that in-
surance proceeds would be used, subject to claims of the bondholders, to make repairs and
that if the corporation did not commence repairs "within a set period," the bond trustee could
make repairs.
279. Private Letter Ruling 8142041 (July 2, 1981).
280. Private Letter Ruling 8246036 (Aug. 13, 1982).
281. See supra notes 147-48 and text accompanying.
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either/or proposition; for example, can the corporation use some proceeds
to clear the land of ruins and remit the balance? If the insurance proceeds
are sufficient to build only a lesser facility, and such a lesser facility is in fact
built, will a favorable 63-20 ruling be nullified? How much time may elapse
before a decision to rebuild or to remit must be made? If the property is not
rebuilt, must the underlying land or the damaged property be conveyed to
the governmental unit? If so, must it be conveyed immediately, or only
upon the discharge of the obligations? If there are excess insurance pro-
ceeds after rebuilding, do the principles underlying Revenue Ruling 63-20
mandate that the excess proceeds be remitted to the governmental unit in-
stead of being retained by the corporation, as all other income of the cor-
poration is retained?
(7) At the latest maturity date of the obligations, the financed property
reasonably must be estimated to have (a) a fair market value equal to at
least twenty percent of its original cost282 and (b) a remaining useful life
which is the longer of one year283 or twenty percent of its originally
estimated useful life."" Prior published private letter rulings also had imposed
these quantitative restrictions on original cost and useful life.2 " Fair market
value does not include any additions to the property,8 6 any increase for in-
flation, or any decrease for deflation during the term of the obligations. 87
It also may not include any costs incurred for the removal and delivery of
possession of the project to the governmental unit."
This condition is waived if the governmental unit (not the corporation)
has exclusive beneficial possession and use of a portion of the property
equivalent to ninety-five percent of its fair rental value during the life of the
obligations." Also, the twin "twenty percent" tests in (a) and (b) will be
deemed met if the nonprofit corporation is required to replace the property
and the replacement property meets those tests. 9
282. Rev. Proc. 82-26, § 3.057(a), 1982-17 I.R.B. 16, 19.
283. See also Private Letter Ruling 8004043 (Oct. 30, 1979).
284. Rev. Proc. 82-26, § 3.057(b), 1982-17 I.R.B. 16, 19-20.
285. See Private Letter Ruling 8142041 (July 21, 1981); Private Letter Ruling 8133057 (May
20, 1981); Private Letter Ruling 8115095 (Jan. 19, 1981); Private Letter Ruling 8034150 (May
30, 1980); Private Letter Ruling 8015098 (Jan. 17, 1980); Private Letter Ruling 8012112 (Dec.
30, 1979); Private Letter Ruling 7605210220A (May 21, 1976). In Private Letter Ruling
8149037 (July 10, 1981), the Service even applied this two-part test to an aircraft carrier being
converted into a museum. Cf. Private Letter Ruling 8015079 (Jan. 16, 1981) (Service observed
that facilities would have "substantial value and useful life" if the test was met).
A similar requirement of 20% useful life and 20% remaining fair market value has been pro-
mulgated by the I.R.S. in Revenue Rulings 75-21 and 75-28, relating to "leveraged lease"
transactions.
286. Rev. Proc. 82-26, § 3.057(a), 1982-17 I.R.B. 16, 19.
287. Id. Accord Private Letter Ruling 8004043 (Oct. 30, 1979).
288. Private Letter Ruling 8004043 (Oct. 30, 1979).
289. Rev. Proc. 82-26, § 3.057(b), 1982-17 I.R.B. 16, 20 See also id. § 3.041(a).
290. Rev. Proc. 82-26, § 3.057(b), 1982-17 I.R.B. 16, 20 See also supra text accompanying
note 178.
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These "twenty percent" conditions are implicit in the requirement that
the political subdivision obtain full legal title upon defeasance of the obliga-
tions. If defeasance is remote, the value of the property could be minimal
when it passes to the political subdivision. In the published private letter
rulings approving 63-20 financing, forty years was the longest cited period
before defeasance of the obligations.2 9' The proposed regulations are more
general, requiring as an element of supervisory control only that the property
"have significant value" at the time it is conveyed to the subdivision.292
One question not resolved by Revenue Procedure 82-26 involves a lease
terminating or a bond maturing when property has more than the required
twenty percent of the useful life and twenty percent fair market value re-
maining. In such circumstances, extension of the lease to the date when only
twenty percent of the useful life and fair market value would remain would
not seem to violate 63-20 principles. Such a situation, however, has not
arisen in any of the published private letter rulings and probably should not
be planned without prior consultation with the Service.
Some concerns of the Service with respect to Revenue Ruling 63-20's
"beneficial interest" requirement are not fully articulated in Revenue Pro-
cedure 82-26. For example, the position of the I.R.S. as to options to pur-
chase and options to renew a lease beyond retirement, was summarized:
The Service does not permit purchase options running to the lessee
because it takes the position that a purchase option is such a qualitative
encumbrance upon the property as to be violative of the provision that re-
quires full, unencumbered legal title to the property to pass to the
associated municipality when the bonds are paid. The suggestion has been
made that such an option is permitted if the option price is at the fair
market value determined at the time of exercise. This was rejected by the
Service on the grounds that freedom from encumbrances ought to include
freedom not to sell the property of the municipality. 293
Although the Service requires the property to pass unconditionally to the
political subdivision, a number of rulings qualified this requirement by
reciting that the transfer would be for some unstated, "nominal" considera-
291. See Private Letter Ruling 8104136 (Oct. 30, 1980).
292. 41 Fed. Reg. 4830 (1976) (to be codified at Treas. Reg. § 1.103(c)(2)(iii)(C)(7)) (proposed
Feb. 2, 1976).
293. Nelson, supra note 29, at 945. Nelson further noted:
On a parity of reasoning, the Service at one time proposed the elimination of all
renewal options. It appeared however, that this would be commercially unrealistic
and so it allows renewal options which will result in occupancy of up to 45 years
(including the primary term) provided that the renewal rentals are at fair rental
value based upon the fair market value of the property at the time the options are
exercised. It was felt that this would give the political subdivisions a valuable
residual within the framework of a commercially feasible transaction.
Id. Nothing in the unpublished rulings, Revenue Procedure 82-26, or the Proposed regulations
indicates that the policy described in the foregoing quotation still is in effect. But see Private
Letter Ruling 8302104 (Oct. 15, 1982) (under certain conditions, lessee had options to lease the
facilities after the bonds were retired).
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tion294 In some cases, a nominal consideration of one dollar was recited."'
Any consideration that would jeopardize the passing of title to the political
subdivision, however, would seem clearly unacceptable.
The requisite transfer of unencumbered legal title is a major difference
between 63-20 financing and conventional IDB financing. In the latter, the
user of the facilities may continue to use the facility after the indebtedness
is paid. In contrast, the private user in a 63-20 financing must derive full
benefit from the project during the term of the indebtedness. 9 6 The spon-
soring political subdivision, however, might not be interested in either
managing the facilities thereafter or negotiating with other potential users
once the indebtedness is retired. Thus, as a practical matter, the original
user may continue to lease the facilities from the political subdivision under
new and market terms.
Finally, the acquisition of property for which tax exemption rulings are
sought must be acquired without the use of coercion. The Service expressed
this concern, in one ruling, by conditioning approval of 63-20 financing
upon the representation that the seller "has not been forced to sell the site
under the threat of inverse condemnation." ' 97 The seller further had to
represent that "no portion of the bond issue is consideration for the settle-
ment of the suit." 298
5. Approval
Revenue Ruling 63-20 requires, fifth, that the state or political subdivi-
sion approve both the corporation and the specific obligations the corpora-
tion will issue.29 9 Revenue Procedure 82-26 states that this requirement is
met if, within one year prior to the issuance of the obligations, the govern-
mental unit adopts a resolution approving both the specific purposes and
activities of the corporation and the specific obligations to be issued by the
corporation.300
Previously, there was no such time limit and no express requirement of a
formal resolution, although the previous published private letter rulings
strongly implied some formal action. Those rulings do not cite any par-
ticular language to be used in this approval. Generally, they recite that the
subdivision approved the corporation ° ' or the articles of incorporation,0 2
294. See, e.g., Private Letter Ruling 8038117 (June 27, 1980); Private Letter Ruling 7921043
(Feb. 23, 1979).
295. See, e.g., Private Letter Ruling 8022058 (Mar. 5, 1980); Private Letter Ruling 7737009
(June 14, 1977).
296. See supra text accompanying notes 19 & 24-25.
297. Private Letter Ruling 7835075 (June 1, 1978).
298. Id.
299. Rev. Rul. 63-20, 1963-1 C.B. 24, 25.
300. Rev. Proc. 82-26, § 3.06, 1982-17 I.R.B. 16, 20.
301. See, e.g., Private Letter Ruling 8136055 (June 11, 1981); Private Letter Ruling 8115095
(Jan. 19, 1981); Private Letter Ruling 8038131 (June 27, 1980).
302. See, e.g., Private Letter Ruling 7409240390A (Sept. 24, 1974).
1982]
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
and that the subdivision also approved the indebtedness3 3 or the transac-
tion. 3'0 The only ruling touching upon this aspect merely made it a condi-
tion that "[a] bond resolution or similar official action (such as prescribed
in [Regulation 1.103-8(a)(5)(v)]) is adopted by the [subdivision] prior to ac-
quisition and construction of the project."30 Regulation 1.103-8(a)(5)(v),
however, is not detailed. The subdivisions frequently also approved either
the 63-20 financing documents '06 or the execution of those documents.3 °7
Revenue Procedure 82-26 is sketchy on this subject and, accordingly, it
would seem advisable for the governmental unit's approvals to be as com-
prehensive as possible.
This approval requirement might be compared with the "public approval
requirement" imposed by Congress in 1982, which must be met if obliga-
tions are to avoid taxable IDB status." 8 An obligation satisfies the require-
ment if, in general, it is approved by the sponsoring governmental unit and
by each governmental unit having jurisdiction over the area in which the
facility is located. 30' Approval must be by the applicable elected represen-
tative of the unit after a public hearing following reasonable public notice
or by voter referendum.3 0 In general, the representative is an elected
legislative body of such unit or the chief elected executive. 3 ' This proviso
represents an effort by Congress to increase scrutiny of obligations that
would be tax-exempt.
Revenue Procedure 82-26 also provides that if the corporation intends to
issue a series of obligations for a single project, all of which are to be
issued within five years, the governmental unit can approve the entire series
of obligations in one resolution adopted within one year prior to the is-
suance of the first issue.' 2 In such circumstances prudence would suggest
obtaining both overall approval initially, and then separate approvals of
each separate issue.
Another crucial issue, frequently discussed in the private letter rulings,
'1 3
is what constitutes a political subdivision capable of approving 63-20 trans-
actions. The description used most often is substantially in accordance with
the existing regulations interpreting section 103 of the Internal Revenue
Code. The regulations define a political subdivision to be "any division of a
State or local governmental unit that is a municipal corporation or that has
303. See, e.g., Private Letter Ruling 8020085 (Feb. 22, 1980); Private Letter Ruling 8017124
(Jan. 31, 1980); Private Letter Ruling 8015079 (Jan. 16, 1980).
304. See Private Letter Ruling 8024114 (Mar. 18, 1980).
305. See Private Letter Ruling 8124149 (Mar. 23, 1981).
306. See Private Letter Ruling 8012112 (Dec. 31, 1979).
307. See Private Letter Ruling 8024114 (Mar. 18, 1980).
308. I.R.C. § 103(k) (enacted by TEFRA, § 215(a)).
309. Id. § 103(k)(2)(A).
310. Id. § 103(k)(2)(B).
311. Id. § 103(k)(2)(E)(i).
312. Rev. Proc. 82-26, § 3.06, 1982-17 I.R.B. 16, 20.
313. See infra note 325, for the cases most frequently cited in the private letter rulings.
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been delegated the right to exercise part of the sovereign power of the State
or governmental unit.""" The Tax Court has identified certain generally
acknowledged sovereign powers of states. The power to tax, the power of
eminent domain, and the police power are the most significant sovereign
powers. 3 ' Although possession of all three of these powers is not necessary
to determine that a political subdivision exists, "more than merely an in-
substantial amount of any or all of these powers must be present before a
political subdivision can be found to exist."36 Thus, an entity that is a
division of a state or local government or that possesses one of these three
attributes of sovereignty will be considered a political subdivision.",
Even if an entity meets the definition of a political subdivision, only the
appropriate subdivision can give the approval. If the approving entity is not
the entity that will receive the property, the Service will not qualify the
financing under Revenue Ruling 63-20.111
It should be noted that other Revenue Rulings, such as those cited" 9 in
Revenue Ruling 63-20 itself and which have slight factual distinctions,
nonetheless may be of relevance by parity of reasoning in interpreting
Revenue Ruling 63-20. There are also published private letter rulings that
reach similar conclusions without citing either Revenue Ruling 63-20 or
other Revenue Rulings.
In summary, Revenue Ruling 63-20 has expanded the financing options
available to political subdivisions. Although its requirements are technical,
they are not onerous. Most importantly, however, compliance with these re-
quirements provides a useful and beneficial financing vehicle. 20
REVENUE RULING 63-20 IN PERSPECTIVE
Context and Criticisms of Revenue Ruling 63-20
Revenue Ruling 63-20 created a new kind of financing, but the ruling was
neither an inevitable development under the Internal Revenue Code nor was
it without substantial criticism. The ruling was not inevitable because sec-
tion 103 of the Internal Revenue Code provided tax-exempt status only for
obligations of a state or political subdivision. Regulations issued in 1921 ex-
panded this to include obligations issued "on behalf of" such entities by
constituted authorities empowered to issue these obligations. 32' As Hart H.
314. Treas. Reg. 1.103-1(b).
315. Estate of Shamberg v. Commissioner, 3 T.C. 131, 143 (1944), cited in Private Letter
Ruling 7921043 (Feb. 23, 1979), inter alia.
316. Id.
317. See, e.g., Private Letter Ruling 8119061 (Feb. 13, 1981) (division of state); Private Let-
ter Ruling 7918050 (Jan. 30, 1979) (three attributes of sovereignty).
318. See Private Letter Ruling 8037107 (June 20, 1980).
319. Rev. Rul. 54-296, 1954-2 C.B. 59; Rev. Rul. 59-41, 1959-1 C.B. 13.
320. One final caveat: Because some state laws might deem 63-20 financing to be an
"unlawful lending of credit" by a political subdivision, it should not automatically be assumed
that 63-20 financing is feasible in every jurisdiction.
321. See T.D. 3146, 23 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 352, 377 (1921).
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Spiegel noted in his leading article criticizing Revenue Ruling 63-20, it is
"assumed that, in view of the history of this regulation, it has the force of
law."322 Nevertheless, "there [was] no impelling reason to stretch the
language of section 103." 313
Spiegel argued that the term "constituted authorities" connoted some sort
of governmental entity and need not have been deemed to apply to officers of
a private corporation organized under a state's general not-for-profit cor-
poration law.32' In addition, the "on behalf of" concept need not have been
extended to situations involving private corporations serving merely as a
financing medium and only indirectly benefiting the state and political sub-
division. According to Spiegel, the concept could have been limited to en-
tities, perhaps including corporations, which the state or subdivision
specifically created to carry out a specific public purpose but without using
the subdivision's credit.32
Spiegel and others especially objected to the exemption for obligations
"issued by a private corporation . . . in carrying out a project which a
private entity desires to foster with the acquiescence or approval of a city or
other political subdivision." 36 Spiegel suggested that a subdivision "has all
to gain and nothing to lose" 3 2 in approving a project. This latter criticism,
however, may be more theoretical than real. Experience probably shows
that political subdivisions examine projects very carefully before approving
them. It is doubtful that the prospect of acquiring a project without cost
will lure approval unless the project accords with the subdivision's long-
term goals.
Current Applicability of the Criticisms
Although some of the foregoing criticisms of Revenue Ruling 63-20 may
be inherently valid, the Service has not reversed the ruling and instead has
reaffirmed it over the years. Therefore, in considering the applicability of
these criticisms today, several points should be kept in mind.
322. Spiegel, supra note 32, at 229.
323. Id. at 232.
324. Id. at 230-31.
325. Id. at 231-32 (citing Commissioner v. Shamberg's Estate, 144 F.2d 998 (2nd Cir. 1944),
cert. denied, 323 U.S. 792 (1945) and Commissioner v. White's Estate, 144 F.2d 1019 (2d Cir.
1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 792 (1945)).
If a political subdivision is sufficiently interested in a project to enact special
legislation creating a development authority, port authority, or other agency vested
with a sufficient quantum of political power to be considered an arm of the state,
acting as manager or operator of a project, the "on behalf" language of the
Treasury regulations may be interpreted to permit such an agency to issue revenue
bonds which qualify for the exemption. But it is quite another thing to allow ex-
emptions for bonds issued by private nonprofit corporations which are created by
private interests and which serve only as a financing medium for such interests.
Spiegel, supra note 32, at 232.
326. Spiegel, supra note 32, at 232.
327. Id. at 227.
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While a twenty-year old Revenue Ruling does not have the "force of
law," 328 Revenue Ruling 63-20 has developed substantial precedential value
in construing the Code. The ruling, therefore, should not be repudiated or
severely curtailed without great thought, especially because of its use in
defining the tax status of millions of dollars of financings.
It also should be noted that many of the criticisms aimed at Revenue Rul-
ing 63-20 are criticisms of industrial development bonds in general. The
pros, cons, and the tax status of such bonds have been debated for decades,
and still are debated. In 1968, however, five years after Revenue Ruling 63-20
was issued and three years after the Spiegel article, Congress attempted to
strike a balance in the area of IDBs. It reaffirmed the exemption for govern-
mental obligations, withdrew the exemption from the IDBs, and excluded cer-
tain small issues from the definition of IDBs.3 2 9 In 1978, Congress increased
the amount of the small issue exemption330 and added additional exemp-
tions for obligations issued to finance certain specified facilities. 3 In 1982,
Congress further restricted IDBs and other tax-exempt obligations,33 ' and,
for obligations issued after December 31, 1986, made the small issue exemp-
tion inapplicable. 33
Revenue Ruling 63-20 does not determine whether a financing is a non-
exempt IDB or whether the financing is tax-exempt because it is not an IDB
or is an IDB subject to the small issue exemption. Rather, Revenue Ruling
63-20 relates only to whether, if the financing otherwise would be tax-
exempt, the obligations will be tax-exempt if issued by a not-for-profit cor-
poration instead of directly by a state or political subdivision.
A political subdivision, under the "small issue" exemption, could issue tax-
free obligations to construct, for example, "aluminum mills, bowling alleys,
department stores, motels and other business projects. ' 34 Absent the small
issue exemption, these obligations might have constituted IDBs benefiting
private parties. Accordingly, the issuance by a not-for-profit corporation of
these tax-free obligations under all the existing restrictions of Revenue Ruling
63-20 should not seriously, if at all, violate the policy determinations made by
Congress.3 ' The policy quarrel is not with Revenue Ruling 63-20's definition
of an "on behalf of" issuer; rather, it is with Congress' definition of an IDB.
Thus, criticisms or proposed changes of Revenue Ruling 63-20 should be dis-.
regarded as inapplicable to the extent that they are directed to the broader
concept of IDBs. Congress has addressed the issue.
328. See supra note 322.
329. See supra text accompanying notes 35-45.
330. See Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 331, 92 Stat. 2763, 2839-40 (amending
1.R.C. § 103(b)(6)(D)) (exemption increased to $10,000,000).
331. See I.R.C. § 103(b)(4), (5) & (8) (listing additional exemptions).
332. See id. § 103(b)(6)(K), (L), (M) and (0) (enacted by TEFRA, §§ 214(a), (b) and (e));
id. §§ 103(j), (k) and (1) (enacted by TEFRA, §§ 215(a), (b), and 310(b)(l)).
333. Id. § 103(b)(6)(N) (enacted by TEFRA, § 214(e)).
334. Spiegel, supra note 32, at 226-27.
335. See supra notes 331-33 and accompanying text.
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Even if Revenue Ruling 63-20, theoretically, could be faulted for allowing
the tax-exempt financing of private projects, the ruling does not appear to
have been abused in practice in recent years. Analysis of all of the publish-
ed private letter rulings reveals only two projects involving factories and a
handful of others that might be described as business projects. 3 ' The large
majority of projects described in the rulings clearly were "public" in
nature.33 ' The remaining projects, in which some private involvement might
be questionable, usually involved nursing or residential facilities for the in-
digent or elderly. Whether the public benefit derived from such projects is
outweighed by the potential private gain involves the same policy question
which underlies the IDB debate. In instances where private involvement
may be found, the private benefit would not be substantial enough, by
statutory definition, to characterize the financing as a non-exempt 1DB.33
Furthermore, analysis of the published rulings show that private parties
were involved as lessees, managers, or operators in less than fifteen percent
of the rulings in which the exemption was recognized.
Thus, although private entities are able to take advantage of Revenue
Ruling 63-20, political subdivisions have in fact been the principal
beneficiaries. The subdivisions have used not-for-profit corporations as a
financing vehicle primarily to circumvent restrictions in local law and to
meet the subdivision's perceived needs. The propriety of such techniques
seems more a question of local law than of federal tax policy.
A major caveat to the foregoing analysis is that many projects financed
on the basis of Revenue Ruling 63-20 rely upon an opinion of counsel
rather than upon a private letter ruling. The number of such unpublished
projects is indeterminable. A higher percentage of projects relying on
counsel's opinion, therefore, may involve private interests.
Revenue Procedure 82-26
Revenue Procedure 82-26 is a welcome codification of many of the
hitherto unwritten rules that apply to Revenue Ruling 63-20 financings.
The Procedure should help Revenue Ruling 63-20 make the transition from
the arcane to the comprehensive and, therefore, should make the Ruling a
more useful tool for political subdivisions.
A revised Procedure would be even more welcome, (a) incorporating even
more of the principles applicable to 63-20 financings, and (b) clarifying
some of the ambiguities in the Procedure. In particular, the term "exclusive
possession and use" should be defined to clarify the role of private parties
in connection with the property financed.3 9 Consideration should be given
to reconciling the requirement in the Procedure that at least "twenty per-
336. See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
337. See supra notes 74-87 and accompanying text.
338. See supra notes 35-45 and accompanying text.
339. See supra notes 188-89 and accompanying text.
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cent useful life" of the property remain at the maturity of a financing4 '
with the more liberal principle embodied in Code Section 103(b)(14) added in
1982 permitting exemption for certain obligations with an average maturity of
up to 120076 of the property's average reasonably expected economic life.3 4
Consideration also should be given to permitting extensions of the date on
which the property financed must be turned over to the political subdivisions,
in cases of lease renewals, refinancings, or the financing of additions or im"
provements, where there would be at least twenty percent of useful life and
twenty percent of fair market value remaining at the extended maturity
date. The provision in Revenue Procedure 82-26 referring to a governing
unit's power to remove a member of a corporation's governing board may
inappropriately encroach upon state general corporation laws.34 2 Finally, the
Revenue Procedure in many instances distinguishes between exclusive
beneficial possession and use by the sponsoring governmental unit 43 and
such possession and use by the nonprofit corporation.314 Revenue Procedure
82-26 is substantially more restrictive in the latter case.34' Such unequal
treatment contradicts the broad applicability of Revenue Ruling 63-20 over
nineteen years and unnecessarily curtails the flexibility of local governmen-
tal uses. To that extent, the Procedure is as overreaching as the proposed
regulations and should be modified.
The Proposed Regulations
Regulations 4 6 defining "constituted authorities" empowered to issue tax-
exempt obligations "on behalf of" a political subdivision were not proposed
until 1976. To the extent that the 1976 proposed regulations codify the un-
written glosses on Revenue Ruling 63-20, the regulations are logical and
useful. To the extent, however, they seek to dictate customary matters of
state law, the proposed regulations are overreaching. These regulations, for
example, prescribe what must be in the charter of the political
subdivision.34 7 In addition, the regulations provide that only specifically
created entities may issue qualified obligations.34 8 Entities created under a
general or not-for-profit corporation statute may not issue 63-20 obliga-
tions. Furthermore, the proposed regulations prescribe the membership re-
quirements for the issuing entity's governing boards, including the terms of
members.34 9 The regulations also mandate that the subdivision have the
340. Rev. Proc. 82-26, § 3.07.
341. I.R.C. § 103(b)(14)(A).
342. Rev. Proc. 82-26, § 3.041(b)(2)(B), 1982-17 I.R.B. 16, 18.
343. Id. § 3.041(a).
344. Id. § 3.041(b),
345. See id. §§ 3.042, 3.055, 3.057(b), 4.012, 4.013.
346. See supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
347. 41 Fed. Reg. 4830 (1976) (to be codified at Treas. Reg. §§ 1.103-1(cX2)(i), 1.103-1(cX2)(iii)(BXl)
(proposed Feb. 2, 1976).
348. Id. (to be codified at Treas. Reg. § 1.103-1(c)(2)(iii)(B)(2)).
349. Id. (to be codified at Treas. Reg. § 1.103-1(c)(2)(ii)).
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ability or duty to become involved in the actual operations of the issuing
entity."10
These types of detailed requirements are perhaps suitable for determining
the tax status of purely private arrangements such as partnerships. They
are, however, inappropriate for dealing with the governmental structure.
Political subdivisions always have had and have utilized flexibility in
creating corporate entities. After creating these entities with specific charter
powers and limitations, political subdivisions have not been involved further
in the entities' operations. The proposed regulations attack this ingrained
practice.
As a practical political matter, many states and political subdivisions cur-
rently utilizing Revenue Ruling 63-20 could not comply with the re-
quirements of the proposed regulations. Thus, rather than merely clarifying
Revenue Ruling 63-20, the proposed regulations substantially would curtail
its application. Although regulations codifying the glosses on Revenue Rul-
ing 63-20 would be appropriate and useful, the proposed regulations do not
comport with well established practices and, therefore, are both too late
and too broad. Nor do they comport with the subsequent and more realistic
Revenue Procedure 82-26.
The Future
The Service's delay in financing the 1976 proposed regulations has been a
mixed blessing. While the delay has caused uncertainty, it avoided making
the undesirable provisions final. The issuance of Revenue Procedure 82-26
has made the need for regulations elucidating Revenue Ruling 63-20 less
urgent. The 1982 Revenue Procedure also seems to have receded from some
of the drastic requirements of the 1976 proposed regulations. The continued
existence of the proposed regulations can only confuse the situation. For all
of the reasons stated, the proposed regulations should be substantially
modified or withdrawn.
Until final regulations are issued or section 103 is further amended, those
desiring to utilize Revenue Ruling 63-20 must proceed primarily on the basis
of past private letter rulings and Revenue Procedure 82-26. Because of the
many rulings which have been issued, the ground rules for most intended
63-20 financings now are much clearer.
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APPENDIX Continued
Date
12/31/79
1/16/80
(supp'd
1/17/80
1/31/80
2/22/80
3/5/80
3/18/80
4/15/80
4/22/80
4/22/80
(revoked
5/13/80
5/29/80
5/30/80
5/30/80
6/20/80
6/27/80
6/27/80
6/30/80
7/23/80
8/19/80
Ruling
8012112
8015079
by 8125027)
8015098
8017124
8020085
8022058
8024114
8028016
8029026
8029033
by 8047033)
8032046
8034067
8034147
8034150
8037107
8038117
8038131
8038183
8042050
8046031
8/27/80 8047033
(revoking 8029033)
8/28/80 8047096
9/26/80 8051121
10/16/80 8102048
(supplementing 7921058)
10/30/80 8104136
1/19/81 8115095
(amended by 8117081)
1/23/81 8116088
1/28/81 8117081
(amending 8115095)
2/13/81 8119061
2/27/81 8121124
Date
3/2/81
3/18/81
3/20/81
3/23/81
3/24/81
(supplementing
3/31/81
5/20/81
6/11/81
6/30/81
7/2/81
Undated
7/10/81
10/5/81
10/30/81
12/15/81
3/30/82
8/13/82
8/13/82
8/25/82
8/31/82
9/15/82
10/15/82
10/15/82
10/21/82
10/29/82
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Ruling
8121170
8124074
8124113
8124149
8125027
8015079)
8126050
8133057
8136055
8139064
8142041
8145078
8149037
8152124
8204180
8211028
8226058
8245073
8246036
8247081
8248131
8251026
8302104
8304011
8304017
8305018
